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Abstract
European  Union  (EU)  recently  went  through  a  long  and  complex  process  of
enlargement and welcomed 10 more new states. Among the 10 new comers, Poland is a
crucial accession country due to its size, geographical position, and large population. In
addition, it has a problematic industrial restructuring and a large agricultural sector. It is
hard  for  the  European  Union  to  digest  Poland  and  therefore  the  outcome  of  the
negotiations with Poland had and will have a leverage effect for other countries with
similar  issues  to  tackle  with  the  EU.  Agriculture  is  considered  as  one  of  the  most
complicated issues between Poland and the EU not only due to the large and inefficient
agricultural sector in Poland, but also due to the internal problems EU is facing with its
policies on agriculture. This thesis will focus on the negotiations between the EU and
Poland on the chapter of agriculture,  which is  one of the 31 chapters of the acquis
communataire. 
Enlargement negotiations are the negotiations on the compliance of the candidate
states  with  the  acquis  communataire  of  the  European  Community.  Acquis
communataire  is  the  legislation  of  the  European  Community.  It  encompasses  the
founding  treaties  of  the  Community,  subsidiary  treaties,  secondary  legislation  and
decisions,  opinions  and  general  principles  of  European  Court  of  Justice.  Acquis  is
presented in 31 chapters to the candidates. 
The thesis aims to analyse the negotiation process between EU and Poland on the
chapter  of  agriculture,  providing an  insight  into  the  context  and  background of  the
negotiations.  Each  negotiation  issue  stated  by  Poland  as  a  response  to  the  acquis
presented by the EU has been discussed thouroughly based on primary resources from
the EU and Poland. 
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Özet
Avrupa Birliği yakın bir tarihte uzun ve zorlu bir müzakere süreci sonrasında 10
yeni ülkeyi daha bünyesine kattı. Bu 10 ülke arasında Polanya gerek ölçeği ve coğrafi
konumu  gerekse  yüksek  nüfusu  nedeniyle  en  önemli  aday  ülkelerdendir.  Ayrıca
Polonya’nın  sorunlu  endüstri  yapısı  ve  büyük  tarım  sektörü  de  sürecin  önemini
vurgulamıştır.  Avrupa  Birliği  için  Polonya  gibi  bir  ülkeyi  hazmetmek  oldukça  zor
olacağından, Polonya ile yapılan müzakerelerin sonuçları, benzer sorunlara sahip diğer
aday ülkeler için de önem taşımıştır.  Tarımın Polonya ve Aavrupa Birliği arasında ne
önemli  konulardan  biri  olmasının  tek  sebebi  Polonya’nın  büyük  ve  verimsiz  tarım
sektörü  değil  aynı  zamanda  AB’nin  kendi  içinde  ortak  tarım  politikası  ile  yaşadığı
sorunları  olmuştur.  Tez,  AB  ve  Polonya  arasındaki  müzakerelere  konu  olan  AB
mezvuatının tarım konusuna odaklanmıştır. 
Genişleme müzakeleri,  aday ülkelerin  AB mevzuatına  uyumunu sağlamak için
yapılan müzakerelerdir. Mevzuat AB hukunun temelini oluşturur ve Birliği oluşturan
antlaşmalar,  ek  antlaşmalar,  ikincil  kanunlar  ve kararlar,  görüşler  ve  Avrupa Adalet
Mahkemesinin genel prensiplerinden oluşur.
Tez  Polonya  ve  AB  arasındaki  tarım  müzakerelerini,  içlerinde  bulundukları
bağlam  ve  altyapı  hakkında  da  açıklamalarda  bulunarak  analiz  etmektedir.  AB
tarafından  sunulan  mevzuatın  ilgili  maddelerine  ilişkin  müzakere  konuları  Polonya
tarafından saptanmış ve bu konular birincil kaynakların yardımıyla irdelenmiştir. 
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Abstract
European Union (EU) recently went through a long
and  complex  process  of  enlargement  and  welcomed  10
more new states. Among the 10 new comers, Poland is a
crucial  accession  country  due  to  its  size,  geographical
position, and large population. Poland has a problematic
industrial  restructuring  and  a  large  agricultural  sector.
Agriculture is considered as one of the most complicated
issues  between  Poland  and  the  EU not  only due  to  the
large and inefficient agricultural sector in Poland, but also
due to the internal problems EU is facing with its policies
on agriculture. This thesis will focus on the negotiations
between the EU and Poland on the chapter of agriculture,
which  is  one  of  the  31  chapters  of  the  acquis
communataire. 
Enlargement negotiations are the negotiations on the
compliance  of  the  candidate  states  with  the  acquis
communataire;  the  legislation  of  the  European
Community. 
The thesis  aims to analyse the negotiation process
between  EU  and  Poland  on  the  chapter  of  agriculture,
providing an insight into the context  and background of
the negotiations. Each negotiation issue stated by Poland
as a response to the acquis presented by the EU has been
discussed  thouroughly based  on  primary resources  from
the EU and Poland. 
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arasındaki müzakerelere konu olan AB mezvuatının tarım
konusuna odaklanmıştır. 
Genişleme  müzakeleri,  aday  ülkelerin  AB
mevzuatına  uyumunu  sağlamak  için  yapılan
müzakerelerdir.
Tez Polonya ve AB arasındaki tarım müzakerelerini,
içlerinde  bulundukları  bağlam  ve  altyapı  hakkında  da
açıklamalarda bulunarak analiz etmektedir. AB tarafından
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
European Union (EU) recently went  through a  long and complex  process  of
enlargement and welcomed 10 more new states. From May 1st, 2004 on EU has
25 members, and four more candidates1 are waiting at its door. However this last
enlargement has been remarkable and distinct from the others since it covered
the  largest  number  of  newcomers  and  it  united  Western  and Central  Europe
within the EU with its Eastern neighbors. Besides its scope, current enlargement
is marked by including eight candidate states which have a communist past. Such
a drastic increase in the size of the Union brings many changes not only in the
institutional system, but also in the Union’s strategic role in global politics and
economy. 
Among the 10 new comers, Poland is a crucial accession country due to its
size,  geographical  position,  and  large  population.  In  addition,  it  has  a
problematic industrial restructuring and a large agricultural sector. It is hard for
the  European  Union  to  digest  Poland  and  therefore  the  outcome  of  the
negotiations with Poland had and will have a leverage effect for other countries
with similar issues to tackle with the EU. Agriculture is considered as one of the
most complicated issues between Poland and the EU not only due to the large
and inefficient agricultural sector in Poland, but also due to the internal problems
EU  is  facing  with  its  policies  on  agriculture.  This  thesis  will  focus  on  the
negotiations between the EU and Poland on the chapter of agriculture, which is
one of the 31 chapters of the acquis communataire. This single case study will
use the negotiation problems stated by Poland with regards to its harmonization
with acquis as well as its budgetary concerns as the units of analysis. 
1 Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey
1
Enlargement  negotiations  are the negotiations  on the compliance  of the
candidate  states  with  the  acquis  communataire  of  the  European  Community.
Acquis  communataire  is  the  legislation  of  the  European  Community.  It
encompasses  the  founding  treaties  of  the  Community2,  subsidiary  treaties3,
secondary legislation4 and decisions, opinions and general principles of European
Court of Justice5. Acquis is presented in 31 chapters to the candidates6. 
Each  enlargement  wave  forces  the  EU  to  re-shape  its  policies  and
institutions,  in  order  to  accommodate  the  needs  of  all  its  existing  and  new
coming members. The EU also has to calculate its gains and losses in a global
context. Therefore, enlargement negotiations are ‘system transformative’ (Friss,
1999), meaning that the entire system of EU is transformed at each enlargement
wave7. UK’s accession and Iberian enlargement demonstrate the impact of new
comers to the policies of the EU. UK’s accession triggered a set of negotiations
2 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1951), European Economic
Community Treaty (1957), Euratom Treaty (1957), Convention on Certain
Institutions Common to the European Community (1957), Merger Treaty
(1965),  Acts  of Accession (1972,  UK, Ireland,  Denmark;  1979, Greece;
1985, Spain and Portugal; 1994, Austria, Finland and Sweden), Budgetary
Treaties  of  1970 and 1975,  Single  European Act  (1986),  Treaty of  the
European  Union  (1992),  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  (1997),  Treaty  of  Nice
(2001)
3 Agreements concluded by the Community exclusively, by the Community
on succession to an earlier agreement or by individual member states
4
Regulations, directives and decisions of the Council and the Commission
5
 Case-law
6
 Chapters are: free movement of goods, freedom of movement for parsons,
freedom  to  provide  services,  free  movement  of  capital,  company  law,
competition  policy,  agriculture,  fisheries,  transport  policy,  taxation,
economic and monetary union,  statistics,  employment and social  policy,
energy,  industrial  policy,  energy,  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,
science and research, education and training, telecom and IT, culture and
audiovisual  policy,  regional  policy  and  co-ordination  of  structural
instruments, environment, consumer protection, justice and home affairs,
customs  union,  external  relations,  common  foreign  and  security  policy,
financial control, finance and budgetary provisions, institutions and other
7 This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why historically  the  EU  leaders  chose  to
manage  enlargement  processes  in  such  a  way  that  each  round  of
enlargements  were  followed  by episodes  of  deepening,  so  that  the  EU
mechanisms could absorb the effects  of widening. 
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for budget reform, since UK became a net contributor to the budget despite low
per capita income level. UK received rather limited compensation from the EU
budget since it has a small agricultural sector8. Terms of UK’s contribution were
renegotiated; however this problem could not be solved for almost a decade and
caused a major stagnation in EU’s history9. Iberian enlargement was blocked for
a  while  for  budgetary reasons  by  Greece,  Italy  and  France  since  Spain  and
Portugal posed a threat to agricultural competition. The European Council came
up with an Integrated Mediterranean Programme to solve this dispute and also
doubled structural funds expenditure10, so that these countries could benefit from
the  structural  funds  to  compensate  their  loss  from  agricultural  competition
(Baldwin, 2001).
Based on these past  experiences,  EU had to calculate the impact of the
largest enlargement ever on its institutions and budget and devise a strategy to
manage the latest enlargement. Following the application of all CEEC, Cyprus,
Malta  and  Turkey,  the  European  Council  in  Maastricht  in  1991  decided  to
examine the implications of enlargement at  Lisbon Summit.  The Commission
presented a report in Lisbon (1992) and stated that the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA)  countries11,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Turkey  and  CEEC  are  eligible  for
8 As  it  will  be  explained,  spending  for  the  financial  measures  of  the
Common  Agricultural  Policy  makes  up  a  great  percentage  of  the  EU
budget. Therefore countries with small  agricultural  sector may have less
contribution from the EU budget.
9 A major budget reform happened after the signing of the Single European
Act  in  1988,  named  Delos-1  package  according  to  the  Head  of  the
European  Commission  Jacques  Delors.  Following  the  budgetary  crises
caused by UK, Delors-1 package finally reinforced budgetary discipline,
added the GNP percentages from member states to the revenues, expanded
the structural funds and kept the UK rebate system as a compromise. The
Council also decided for a ceiling for CAP expenditures, which prohibited
any increase  of  the  budget  for  CAP  above  74  % of  the  Unions  GDP
growth.
10 Structural  funds  are  an  instrument  to  increase  the  conditions  in  the
underdeveloped regions within the EU by allocating financial support to
development projects in these regions.
11 EFTA countries are Sweden, Finland, Austria and Norway. While the
first three countries entered the EU, Norway decided to stay out based on
the  results  of  the  national  referendum in  28  November  1994  (Granell,
1995)
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membership. The Commission also prepared a formula for reinforced accession,
however  the Council  decided at  the Edinburgh session (Dec 92)  to  postpone
discussing components  of  this  report  at  its  next  meeting due  to  the negative
climate against  accession influenced by the severe economic problems of the
Community. In the next stages the European Commission played a key role by
formulating objective criteria for membership, which would convince the macro-
policy  makers.  These  criteria  were  announced  at  the  Copenhagen  European
Council  (June 93). The Council  decided for improved market access with the
eventual goal of membership for CEEC. 
The Copenhagen criteria are as follows:
 stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights
and minority rights
 functioning market economy and capacity to cope with the competitive
pressure of the EU
 ability to adopt the acquis
 capacity to absorb new members without endangering the momentum
of European integration (Wallace, 2000). 
However EU still had problems in agreeing upon a pre-accession strategy.
Diverse  opinions  from  member  states  and  their  constituencies  towards
enlargement influence the scope of pre-accession measures. Different offers were
put  on  the  table.  The  Commission  promoted  an  inclusive  and  progressive
formula for improved trade opportunities through liberalization of agriculture,
limited use of commercial defense instruments and more effective use of Phare
Programme12 in line with the example of structural  funds. On the other hand
agriculture is one of the most sensitive sectors in the EU and its liberalization
was strongly objected by some member states. UK and Italy proposed political
dialogue  through  involving  CEEC  in  Second  pillar13,  Common  Foreign  and
12 Phare  is  a  grant  scheme ensuring  finance  for  economic  development
administrative  reconfiguration,  social  change,  legislative  work to  enable
candidate  countries  meet  the  criteria  for  membership  of  the  EU
(http://www.europa.eu.int/grants/grants/phare/phare_en.htm)
13 Following the Maastricht Summit, the European Union took its current
structure  in  three  pillar  form.  First  pillar  is  the  European  Community,
Euratom  and  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  Second  Pillar  is
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the third pillar  is  Justice and
Home Affairs.
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Security Policy and Third pillar; Justice and Home Affairs. However France and
Spain were still worried about the peace and security in the Mediterranean and
pushed for  a  programme covering the  Mediterranean countries,  which would
integrate economic, political and security dimensions.
The outcome was a compromise over “structured dialogue” between EU
institutions and the candidates, aiming to integrate the candidates to the single
market through regulatory alignment. Corfu European Council (June 1994) also
decided  for  the  preparation  of  a  White  Paper14 on  internal  market  by  the
Commission, which would guide the member states in establishing the necessary
structures and legislation15.  This White Paper is  especially remarkable for the
entire  negotiation  process,  since  it  highlighted  the  importance  of  certain
legislative areas. It stressed that some other areas are difficult to be implemented
fully by the candidates since they are too costly and more suitable for developed
economies; therefore should be left to post-accession period. This move of the
Commission had an influence in the acquis negotiations16. 
Madrid European Council (December 95) planned concrete steps to start
with the negotiations. It asked the Commission to present its Opinion17 on the
candidates, prepare a report on the impact of enlargement, which should cover
the financial  perspective as well  and propose indicative dates  for the start  of
negotiations with CEEC, Cyprus and Malta.  (Council  of the European Union
1995b:23)
EU was urged to put the institutional reform into its agenda, since it hardly
had the institutional capacity to accommodate an enlarged Union. Amsterdam
14 White paper is a document on the strategy of the Union in a particular
issue prepared by the Commission and adopted by the Council. Legally it is
not  binding  for  the  member  states;  however  it  shows  the  vision  and
direction of the Union on the specific issue; therefore is highly important.
15 The  Corfu  Council  also  decided  for  a  Mediterranean  Programme as
proposed  by France  and Spain,  which  covered  all  countries  around the
Mediterranean sea. 
16 Another  influence  of  the  white  paper  was  the  change  it  imposed
concerning the involvement of different DG’s. Following the stress of the
internal market alignments, DG XV responsible for single market took the
lead in the enlargement process. 
17 Opinion  expresses  Commission’s  assessment  of  the  applicant  states
regarding their compliance with the Copenhagen criteria.
5
Treaty was meant to ensure efficiency in decision making, fair representation,
greater accountability, transparency and legitimacy; however it failed to achieve
a true reform. The institutional reform was postponed to Nice Summit and later
at Laeken Summit (Dec 2001) the decision was taken to convey the “Convention
for the Future of Europe”.
Following the decision of the European Council, the Commission came up
with AGENDA 2000, which tackled the entire issue of enlargement in detail.
The  AGENDA  2000  aimed  to  present  the  main  objectives  to  strengthen
Community  policies  within  an  enlarged  Europe  and  the  new  financial
perspective.  In its  AGENDA 2000, the Commission proposed a differentiated
approach  towards  the  candidates,  since  each  had  varied  distances  to  full
compliance with the acquis. The Commission also stressed the importance of full
acquisition with the acquis, since EU faced major obstacles in especially the case
of UK, when the accession negotiations  were completed without  achieving a
necessary level of convergence. AGENDA 2000 not only evaluated the impact of
enlargement in different policy areas of the EU, it  also gave a more concrete
shape to the entire process. It even proposed a specific time-table, which foresaw
2002 as an optimistic date of accession for the first wave candidates. 
AGENDA 2000  presented  at  the  Luxembourg  European  Council  (Dec.
1997) also covered the Opinion of the Commission on the applicant states based
on long questionnaires on compliance with the acquis filled in by each one of
them. The Commission  presented Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and Cyprus as ready for the negotiations. However member states had
other  political  or  economic  priorities,  therefore  the  final  decision  about  first
wave  candidates  were  made  based  on  political  reasons  rather  than  objective
criteria offered by the Commission. The compromise between the Commission
position and Council preferences were somehow reflected to the final outcome,
since the Council decided for a bilateral and intensive screening procedure with
the first five CEEC and a multilateral and less thorough procedure for the five
other  candidates.  The  Council  decided  for  a  financial  aid  scheme  for  all
candidates  with  a  priority  to  more  needy states,  in  order  to  avoid  upsetting
candidates like Turkey. Last but not least the Council decided for other channels
of  accession  in  the  pre-negotiation  stage,  such  as  Accession  partnerships,
Regular reports and the European Conferences.
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Poland  followed  this  path  of  accession  since  its  formal  application  to
become a member state of the EU (1994). This work will summarize activities of
the Polish government for this purpose; however the focus will be kept on the
negotiations specifically on the chapter of agriculture as a core policy area for
both the EU and Poland. The following chapter on the theoretical and historical
background of enlargement will explain the theoretical framework used for the
analysis of the negotiations. It will also explain the structure of the negotiation
process and provide information on the specific  chapter  of agriculture.  Third
chapter will focus on the activities undertaken by both parties during the pre-
negotiation phase, whereas the fourth chapter will describe the actual negotiation
phase. The last chapter will present the concluding remarks on the enlargement
negotiations on the chapter of agriculture.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
CONTEXT
 
2.1. Theoretical Background
This  work  will  use  two  frameworks  for  the  analysis  of  the  negotiations  on
agriculture.  First,  the  overall  process  of  negotiations  on  agriculture  will  be
described according to Druckman's framework of influences and processes of
negotiations  (see  figure  I;  Druckman,  2003).  Secondly,  the  outcomes  of  the
negotiations phase will be analysed according to the decision units framework of
Hermann  et  al  (Hermann  et  al,  2001).  As  explained  above,  enlargement
negotiations  are  institutionalized  due to past  experiences of  the  EU and they
shape the future of the EU in many policy areas. .   
Adjusting  Druckman's  framework  to  the  context  of  the  enlargement
negotiations, the introduction chapter of the thesis describes the parties involved,
issues, characteristics and process of the negotiations as conditions. The third
chapter will describe the pre-negotiation phase, whereas the fourth chapter will
deal with the actual negotiation phase. Finally, the negotiation outcomes will be
evaluated  according  to  the  process  outcomes  chart  of  the  decision  units
framework.  The  thesis  will  not  cover  the  implementation  phase,  since  the
negotiated agreement has just started to be implemented. 
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Figure I. A framework of influences and processes of negotiation
Source:  Druckman, D. “Negotiation” in Cheldelin,  S.,  Druckman,  D. &
Fast, L (eds.), Conflict, (London& New York: Continuum, 2003)
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The decision making process in the enlargement negotiations is illustrated
in Figure II. European Commission prepares a draft  common position for the
European  Council.  The  European  Council  representing  all  member  states
discusses the draft common position and adopts it as the common position of the
European Union on the issue it covers. However even if one member state would
disagree with the draft common position, then the respective member state could
block the decision, so that the European Commission will have to redraft another
proposal to present to the Council of the European Union (Granell; 1995)
For  the  evaluation  of  the  negotiation  process  outcomes,  Hermann  et  al
present  six  possible  outcomes  of  decision  making;  concurrence,  mutual
compromise\consensus,  deadlock,  one  party's  position  prevails,  lopsided
compromise,  and fragmented symbolic action. If parties concur,  it  means that
they reach an agreement  reflecting their  initial  positions.  If there is  a mutual
compromise/consensus,  it  means  that  both  parties  made some concessions  in
order  to  settle  the  negotiation.  However,  in  lopsided  compromise,  one  party
yields up to a limited extend, just to make sure that the other party saves face
towards its constituencies. In case of a deadlock, the parties cannot come to an
agreement. Table I summarizes the characteristics and implications of process
outcomes. The outcomes of the negotiations on enlargement will  be described
based on this table. 
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Table I Process Outcomes
Range of preferences
represented in the decision
Distribution of Payoffs
Symmetrical Asymmetrical
One Party’s Concurrence  (all  own
deicisons: see it as a final)
Mixed Party’s Mutual  Compromise  /
Concensus  (Members  got  all
possible  at  the  moment
monitor  for  change  in
political  context;  seek  to
return to decision if think can
change  outcome  in  their
favor)
Lopsided
compromise 
(Some  members
own  position,
others do not; latter
monitor  resulting
action nad political
context;  agitating
for  reconsideration
of decision)  
No Party’s Deadlock (Members know no
one did better than the others;
seek to redefine the problem
so solutions or trade-offs are
feasible
Fragmented
Symbolic  Action
(No  members  own
decision;  seek  to
change the political
context  in order to
reconstitute
decision unit)
Source: Margaret Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy”, International
Studies Review, Vol.3, No.2 (2001), p.72
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FIGURE II Process of negotiations
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Commission Presents Acquis Topic By 
Topic To Applicants
Applicant Country Accepts Acquis 
In Full
Applicant Country Asks For 
Exploratory Talks For 
Clarification
Applicant Country 
Considers Acquis Not 
Directly Applicable
Topics Declared Non-
Problematic And No 
Negotiation Required
Topics Consider Non-
Problematic But 
Technical Adaptations 
Required
Commission States DCP Of The 15, Matching 
Applicant Requests With The Acquis, Or 
Proposing A 'Third Option'
One Or More Of 15 Does Not Agree With 
DCP Submitted By Commission
Renegotiation Of DCP Between 
Commission And 15 To Arrive At CP 
To Be Agreed By Council At 
COREPER Or Ministerial Level
Council Accepts Solutions Proposed 
By Commission In DCP, Converting 
DCP Into CP
Presentation Of CP With 
Solution Proposed By 15 To 
Applicant Country At 
Deputy Or Ministerial 
Negotiation Sessions
Applicant Country Does Not Accept Proposal 
Included In CP And Presents Counter-
Proposal
Applicant Country Agrees 
On Proposal Made By The 
EU
Council And Commission Rework CP To Re-Present 
To Applicant Country With New Solutions To Reach 
Agreement (One Or More Times)
Agreements On Solutions Transformed Into Articles For 
Accession Act By Drafting Committee Composed Of 
Commission, The 15 And The 10
Drafting Of Accession Act, 
Embodying Agreements Reached 
At Conference And Unilateral 
Decisions
Applicant Country Declares 
Topics Problematic, Asking For 
Transitional Measures, 
Presenting Position Paper
It  is  rather  difficult  to  assess  the  outcomes  based  solely on  the  Act  of
Accession. The Act of Accession is more the output of the negotiations rather
than the outcome, since for certain negotiation issues the outcome can only be
assessed  after  the  implementation  phase.  This  outcome  will  depend  on  the
impact of the negotiation outputs. The impact is mostly difficult to assess since it
is  not certain how the conditions in the agreement will  be applied (Undertal,
2001). The post-negotiation phase might also change some aspects of the agreed
upon solutions or on the contrary the candidate states may adapt themselves to
the new conditions and give more priority to Community interests rather than
their  national  interests  in  the  long  run.  Additionally  it  might  be  difficult  to
foresee  the  aggregate  impact  of  the  negotiation  outcomes,  since  the  issues
negotiated  upon are  rather  complex  (Winham,  1977a).  As  a  response to  this
problem, Undertal proposes the following parameters to evaluate the outcomes;
efficiency, stability, distribution of resources and distance from opening position.
The impact  of the Act  of Accession will  be discussed based on the research
conducted on Polish agriculture using the following parameters: 
Efficiency:  Efficiency of the process of negotiation relates to the level of
information of both parties about the entire process and is vital to reach more
integrative solutions and reduce the costs of the negotiation. Parties need to have
perfect information about the process and issues at stake, in order to come up
with an efficient set of negotiations. For the case of the enlargement negotiations
the  EU is  very advanced in  multi-issue,  multi-party negotiations,  particularly
enlargement negotiations due to past experiences. EU is also the rule-setter for
the  process;  therefore  it  has  a  strong  advantage  compared  to  the  candidate
countries,  which  are  mostly introduced to  the  EU system in  the last  decade.
Another constraint to efficiency is existence of multiple criteria for integrative
solutions.  Since member states  and candidate  states,  as  well  as  supranational
level of EU and external factors, have diverse priorities and criteria, it is rather
difficult  to come up with satisfactory outcomes for all  parties. There are also
process-generated  problems,  which  hamper  the  formation  of  integrative
solutions. The duality of EU level negotiations, where the EU has to negotiate
externally with the candidates and internally among the member states is a major
complexity.  Commitments  and/or  experiences  in  the  pre-negotiation  stage
explained in previous chapters are also set backs in the process. Candidate states
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can increase the efficiency by increasing their expertise in EU level negotiations
and investigating past enlargement negotiations. 
Stability: An outcome of a negotiation is stable if the parties are committed to
implement  the  agreed  upon terms.  If  the  outcome of  the  negotiations  is  not
stable, it would cause an extra complication in the EU setting, since EU would
be letting the Trojan horses inside its castle, which are dissatisfied with what has
been offered to them. The candidate states might try to change the outcome in
their  favor  as full  members once they are  in  the EU. In the post  negotiation
phase, these new comers will have the power and intention to block the digestion
of enlargement by insisting on protecting their own interests. Therefore EU has a
strong interest in concluding this process with stable solutions. Especially UK is
a significant example in EU history since UK blocked many reforms, since UK
was not fully satisfied with the terms of Act of Accession.
Distribution  of  resources: Distribution  of  the  resources  is  calculated
according  to  the  net  benefit  that  the  parties  gain  from  the  agreement.  This
calculation is made according to the proportion of the share of costs, distribution
of  costs  according  to  the  party  responsible  for  the  cost  incurred,  equity and
benefits according to needs. It is not possible to measure the costs and benefits
only in financial  terms, because some costs occurred are for measures, which
would  have  been  adopted  by Poland  anyway;  such  as  higher  veterinary and
environmental standards. Distribution of resources will be analyzed for different
negotiation issues and overall cost-benefit assumptions will be discussed.
Distance  from  opening  position: Distance  from  opening  position  is
considered as an indicator of the performance and fairness of the negotiations.
However,  these  assumptions  cannot  be  very  accurate  for  enlargement
negotiations, since there are many linkages among issues. EU and the candidates
work out several package deals and trade-offs in order to balance the concessions
made.  Therefore  in  the  analysis,  distance  from the  opening  position  will  be
presented, however the outcome evaluation won’t be based solely on it.
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2.2 About the Negotiation Process
In  this  section,  I  will  explain  the  structure  and  the  process  of  the
enlargement  negotiations.  Enlargement  negotiations  are  organizational
negotiations,  which  occur  within  the  context  of  the  European  Community18.
Druckman (2003) distinguishes organizational negotiations from other type of
negotiations due to their structure and the organizational  culture involved. By
structure, he refers to the bureaucracies within an organization involved in the
decision  making.  Organizational  culture  is  determined  by  the  organizational
values and assumptions about proper practices or activities (Druckman, 2003).
EU in general had a highly developed negotiation culture, since the entire system
is a negotiated settlement among member states and\or supranational institutions.
EU  has  a  specifically  institutionalized  process  of  managing  enlargement
negotiations based on its previous experiences.
Enlargement negotiations are rather complex since they are multi-party and
multi-issue  negotiations.  Although  technically  the  negotiations  take  place
between the EU as a primary party and the candidate state as the second primary
party to the negotiation, decisions on the EU level are made among all member
states.  Since  there  are  “two levels”  of  decision  making;  within  the  EU,  and
between the EU and the candidate state; enlargement negotiations are multi-party
negotiations.(Putnam 1988) Additionally expectations of the constituents of EU
member states, constituents of candidate states as well as the decision makers of
all  parties  might  be  in  conflict  with  each other.  This  state  is  defined as  the
boundary role conflict by Druckman (2003) and as “two-level” games by Putnam
(1988), since the negotiators find themselves in a boundary role among all parties
involved.    
They are multi-issue, because the entire acquis with its 31 chapters are put
on the negotiation table and the issues in these chapters are linked during the
negotiation19. Additionally EU decision making system is either supranational or
18 For research on negotiations within  the EU: Elgström et al, 1998;
Pfetsch, F., 1998 and Friss, L., 1999.
19 Friss  (1999)  claims  that  the  issues  in  the  chapter  of  agriculture
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intergovernmental based on the specific policy area. EU is based on an economic
union  among  its  members;  however  it  strives  to  become  a  political  union
promoting democratic values and a liberal market. EU pools the sovereignty of
its member states, in order to ensure a single market within its borders. Therefore
there is a delicate balance between national interests and community interests
within the decision making system. Areas within the scope of market economy
are under the Community competence, meaning that they are decided upon at the
supranational  level.  Issues  regarding  “high  politics”  are  decided  solely  on
intergovernmental level, whereas issues considered as “low politics” is decided
according  to  a  network  model,  where  other  stakeholders  than  national
governments  are also involved (Friis,  1998).  Enlargement is  one of the areas
addressed  at  the  intergovernmental  level  because  it  is  considered  as  macro
policy. On the other hand, once the political decision in favor of enlargement is
reached at the intergovernmental level, negotiations on the adherence of member
states to the acquis are mostly concerned with the internal market affairs; thus are
rather technical meso policies20. They touch upon many areas, which are under
the community competence on the supranational level. The EU has to reach a
consensus  between  its  macro  and  meso  policies  throughout  the  process
(Sedelmeier, 2001). As explained above, the outcomes of the negotiations have
to be acceptable not only to the candidate state and to the EU as a whole but also
to each member state individually. Agriculture is an area, which causes conflicts
among meso and macro policies since its early introduction. At the macro level,
could  have  been  linked  to  the  problematic  issues  related  to  land-
ownership and environmental standards.
20 Sedelmeier explained the controversy between the political interest and
its  actual  reflection  in  policies  and  agreements  with  the  concept  of
‘composite policy’. The overall framework and parameters of policies such
as Eastern enlargement,  single market  or agriculture are decided on the
macro level in an intergovernmental decision-making system. However the
details and substance of these policies do also involve distinctive groups of
policy  makers  and  supranational  institutions  of  the  European  Union,
therefore  they are  set  on  a  meso-level.  This  composite  policy  making
generates  obstacles  in  strategic  planning  and  the  results  are  up  to  the
congruence of  preferences of macro-policy makers and the structure of the
policy  coordination  process.  This  setting  however  gives  the  European
Commission  a  special  role;  the  Commission  often  finds  itself  in  the
position  of  a  mediator  between  meso  policy makers  and  final  decision
making organs on the macro level (Sedelmeier, 2000).
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it is a highly sensitive topic due to the great percentage the CAP measures cover
in  the  EU  budget.  Additionally  as  the  EU  enlarges  and  evolves,  its  macro-
economic  priorities  also  shift  from  agriculture  to  information  and  new
technologies. At the meso level it is a common policy requiring several technical
calculations based on the overall needs and necessities of the agricultural market
in the EU and towards the third parties within the framework of World Trade
Organization  (WTO).  Therefore  enlargement  negotiations  on  this  chapter  are
particularly complicated. Their analysis illustrates how the parties tried to merge
their interests at meso and macro levels. 
Parties Involved In the Negotiations:
Primary Parties: The primary parties of the enlargement negotiations are
the European Union and Poland. Poland is represented by a negotiation team,
which  is  an  inter-ministerial  team for  the  preparation  and implementation  of
negotiations composed of 18 members at deputy minister level assisting the chief
negotiator  Jan  Kulakowski.  European  Union  is  represented  by  the  Council
composed  of  the  respective  ministers  of  the  member  states.  However  the
Commission with its Enlargement Task Force unit has a pivotal role throughout
the entire process. The Commission is responsible for presenting the chapters to
the Polish team and after receiving their response, it drafts the common position
of the EU to be presented to the Council. Therefore, the Commission most of the
time acts as the protector of supranational interests over the national interests of
both parties as well as a mediator between them. 
The constituencies of both parties do not take active and direct part during
the negotiations, however they have a strong say about the outcome. In the case
of agriculture internal secondary parties were farmers’ organizations both in EU
and  in  Poland.  Once  the  negotiations  are  concluded,  the  national  level
parliaments have to ratify the enlargement. On the European level, the European
Parliament, which is the only directly elected organ of the European Union, gives
its assent21 to the entire process; again once the negotiations are concluded and
21 Assent  is  a  decision  making  procedure  of  the  EU,  when  the
Parliament has to give its consent to the Council's decision.
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an agreement has been reached. The enlargement cannot take place without the
assent  of  the  European  Parliament.   Concerning  the  candidate  country,  after
successful closure of all  chapters,  Poland had to bring its membership to the
European Union to a national referendum in Poland. The final word was left to
the constituencies of the Polish government, namely their citizens according to
simple majority. 
Secondary  Parties:  Each  chapter  encompasses  issues  related  to  diverse
sectors; therefore have a number of different secondary parties interested. A very
important external secondary party is the World Trade Organization due to the
parallel  negotiations between WTO and EU as well  as CEEC on agricultural
trade. The WTO pushes European Union for further liberalization of its trade
regime. Concerning Poland, this pressure of the WTO has a leverage effect in
favor of the EU, since Poland has a more protective trade regime towards the
third countries, which are party to the WTO. 
Issues:
Issues concerning the chapter on agriculture could be summarized under
three headings:
1. Direct payments from the EU budget to Polish farmers according to certain quotas
2. Quotas
3. Preparatory, transitory or permanent measures 
Negotiations on these issues will be analyzed based on primary resources
produced by the Polish government and the EU. These resources are the position
paper of Poland on the chapter of agriculture issued in 1999, Regular Reports
issued by the Commission from 1998 until 2003, Reports of the Commission on
the negotiation process, Act of Accession between Poland and the EU as well as
the acquis communataire.
Formal  negotiations are in the form of offers and counter offers  by the
involved parties. After the presentation of the relevant acquis chapter to Poland
by the  Commission,  Poland  issued  its  first  position  paper.  The  Commission
worked on this position, in order to draft a counter offer in the form of a common
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position  of  the European Union.  This  draft  is  negotiated among the  member
states and evaluated according to the balance of satisfaction of national interests
as well as strategic interests of the EU. As a result of this internal negotiation, a
'common  position'  was  adopted  and  presented  to  Poland.  This  process  was
repeated until  an agreement  is reached. In the meantime negotiation meetings
took place in both ministerial and deputy levels. The rotating presidencies of the
European Union determined the dates and agenda of the meetings together with
the  Polish  representatives.  These  parallel  meetings  were  reported  by  the
Secretariat General of the Council. These negotiation meetings aim transitional
periods for incorporation of the acquis, authorization of temporary derogations or
creation  of  a  “third  option”  (Granell,  1995).  Third  option  is  an  alternative
solution and seeks to integrate most important needs and interests of the involved
parties in this alternative solution. Therefore when the existing options do not
suffice to accommodate the needs of the parties at least on a minimal level, then
they need  to  come  up  with  innovative  solutions  acceptable  for  all,  which  is
complicated but possible if both sides are well informed and well prepared.  
After  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations,  experts  from  member  states,
candidate  states,  Council  Secretariat  and  the  Commission  prepare the  Act  of
Accession.  This  Act  was  presented  to  the  European  Parliament,  so  that  the
Parliament  could  give  its  assent.  Afterwards  Polish  citizens  voted  on  the
accession of Poland to the EU at the referandum in August 2003. As the last
stage of the negotiations Poland and EU signed the Act of Accession (2004). 
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2.3. About Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union and its
Effect on the EU budget
The thesis is dealing with the negotiations on the chapter of agriculture,
since it is one of the most important issues on the enlargement agenda. On the
one hand the share of agriculture makes up almost half of the EU budget and on
the other hand the new comers still have a great percentage of their population in
rural areas and/or in agricultural sector. Therefore negotiations on this chapter
were especially important for both the decision makers and their constituencies.
Agriculture  is  an  important  common  policy  area  of  the  European
Community  and  is  regulated  according  to  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy
(CAP) designed in  late  60s.  CAP aimed to  restore  agricultural  production to
guarantee food security and ensure a decent living standard for farmers in a  post-
war climate. It is based on the following principles:
 Creation of a single market in agricultural raw materials and first stage processing to support free
trade
 Community preference, which means giving priority to Community member states in agricultural
trade
 Financial solidarity among member states, which will be ensured by pooled resources of member
states to support other member states with large and problematic agricultural markets. 
(EPPA, 2003)
CAP is disputed largely by liberal traders and considered as an obstacle to
a  competitive  European  trade.  However  before  relying  solely  on  economic
arguments, a deeper insight on the rationale of CAP is required. The interwar
years had a destructive impact on the agriculture sector due to the collapse of the
prices.  Farmers’  reacted  to  this  situation  by  joining  right  wing  movements
protesting against the governments.  CAP has been used as a political instrument
to gain the support of the farmers’ society to the Europeanization process and
increase  their  loyalty  to  democratic  systems.  CAP  encompassed  anti-market
strategies, in order to protect small farmers and provide them with equal living
standards  as  the  workers  in  other  progressive  sectors  of  the  economy.
Additionally  CAP  was  an  instrument  to  tie  an  important  interest  group  to
supranational  decision  making.  This  supranational  policy  helped  pooling  the
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power  of  agricultural  sector  of  member  states  against  external  pressures  in
international agricultural trade; therefore have the Community a stronger saying
in political economy. CAP also sought to mediate between the national macro-
economic concerns and the agricultural sector. Still its rationale is social welfare
rather than economic concerns. The share of agriculture in average EU GDP,
which is not more than 0.6 % already proves the political importance of CAP.
Despite the economic revolution and ups and downs in the European economy,
CAP  remained  basically  the  same.  Rieger  explains  the  reasons  behind  this
stability of the policy as follows:
 CAP is an income securing policy vis-à-vis a large and heterogeneous group
 It releases the individual governments of member states from deciding on the needs of different
farming groups.
 It  makes  use  that  the  farming  sector  keeps  on  supporting  the  European  Unification  and  its
supranational character
 It uses a comprehensive and product-specific pricing system in order to balance heterogeneous
needs of farmer groups.
 It protects its own measures by satisfying a large segment of the population and interests of all
member states with a large agrarian population (Rieger, 2000).
During the post war years, farmers were not close to the state apparatus.
Here again CAP brought them closer to the process of European unification. 
CAP as a common policy in the European Union has five objectives: 
1. increasing the productivity in agriculture, 2. guarantee farm income, 3.
stabilizing  markets,  4.  ensuring  security  of  food  supply,  5.  guaranteeing
reasonable prices to consumers (Roederer-Rynning, 2003: 135). CAP is pursuing
these objectives via the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Funds, as
well as market regulatory instruments. 
In the first two decades from late 1960’s on, CAP managed to secure self-
sufficiency of the European agricultural market, stable prices and decrease the
number of farmers to some extend. However beginnings of 1980s were marked
by increased surpluses  and spending.  Market  organization objectives  of  CAP
cover fixed prices for reduced risks for farmers and redistribution of incomes, so
that farming society could live in decent life standards. However implementation
of CAP did not suit to the objectives pre-set. Bigger farms benefited a lot more
that the smaller farms, which actually needed more protection. According to the
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figures presented by the Commission, 85% of the subventions were distributed to
25% of the farms existing. The CAP measures in general supported industrial
production  and  forced  small  farms  out  of  business.  Due  to  the  fixed  prices
guaranteeing farmers  incomes,  the  overall  level  of agricultural  product  prices
increased  at  the  expense  of  the  consumers.  CAP  subsidies  also  caused  an
overproduction not only because of improved technological standards but also
due  to  the  export  subsidies  encouraging  the  farmers  to  produce  more.  It  is
reported by the Commission that up to 1993, storage and export subsidies made
up the highest expenditure categories. Regional measures for rural development
remained ineffective. Small farmers could only survive thanks to new resources
of income and welfare payments. These alternative resources play a crucial role
for the last enlargement, since the objective of shrinking the agrarian population
could  only be  achieved  by providing  them with  different  skills  and  welfare
payments. 
Other  concerns  came  into  appearance  in  time.  Despite  its  status  as  a
common  policy,  CAP  was  never  truly  a  supranational  policy.  The  decision
making  system is  structured  in  such  a  way that  national  interests  still  rule.
Council preserves the power to decide for substantive legislation. Meetings of
Council  of  Agricultural  Ministries  are  prepared  by  a  Special  Committee  on
Agriculture consisting of national civil servants. Council delegates its powers of
implementation  to  the  Commission;  however  it  requests  consultation  with
national  committees.  Each  market,  organized  according  to  CAP  has  its  own
management  committee,  chaired by a Commission official.  These committees
host  representatives  of  member  states  and  take  their  decisions  according  to
qualified majority voting. Same method is used for the management of guidance
funds.  The European Parliament  had a  very limited  role until  the BSE crisis
popped up, which caused a great uprising of the EP.  Parliamentary Committee
of Inquiry, gathered in September 1986, threatened the Commission by censure
due to mismanagement and forced the Commission to include the EP into the
legislation on food quality and animal health issues within seven months.  This
uprising did not only change the procedure of consultation to co-decision22 for
certain  CAP measures,  it  also  highlighted  health  and  consumer  protection  in
22 Consultation procedure requires consultation of the EP on the respective
issue to be decided upon by the Council. However co-decision procedure
directly involves EP in the decision making.
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agricultural policy-making. 
CAP instruments managed to increase productivity in agriculture; however
one of the consequences of increased production was overproduction and falling
prices.  CAP  made  up  for  falling  prices  by  price  support  and  direct  income
payments  to  farmers,  which  cause  persistent  distortions  in  the  agricultural
market.  Another  consequence  of  increase  production  was  the  environmental
pollution. Environmental concerns were never brought up by the decision makers
and farming societies, until strong interest groups for environmental protection
put pressure on the EU. 
In 1971, the fixed exchange rate system of the Community has collapsed;
therefore agricultural market needed a system to compensate for the losses due to
fluctuating  exchange  rates.  Monetary  Compensatory  Amounts  (MCA)  were
introduced which were payments having similar effect as customs duties. MCA’s
were  used  as  side  payments  within  the  Council  for  the  sake  of  CAP’s
sustainability. 
After  the  single  market  MCA  was  phased  out  of  the  CAP  measures.
Therefore Council needed new tools to manage package deals. Berlin European
Council on 9th of March 1999 approved the proposal of AGENDA 2000; namely
national  envelopes for beef and milk  sectors.  These envelopes could be used
according  to  national  interests.  Therefore  this  measure  also  meant  a
renationalisation  of  CAP  instruments.  Additionally  structural  programmes
introduced  were  also  used  according  to  national  priorities.  While  southern
countries used these programmes against part time farming, Germany preferred
right the opposite and supported part-time farming. This new instrument helped
to  decrease  tension  among  member  states,  however  caused  much  more  of
diversity among agricultural policies of member states as well as decreased EU’s
power towards external actors in agricultural-related matters (Wieger, 2002).
Decision making on CAP caused new problems since annual decisions on
prices for farm products made strategic policy planning and control over CAP
expenditure  impossible.  Additionally  the  decisive  organ,  the  Council  was
composed of agriculture ministries only, who were only concerned about their
area  and  lacked  an  oversight  of  European  trade.  This  setting  brought  about
legitimacy concerns due to the lack of involvement of interest groups.
CAP  was  supposed  to  be  self  financing  from  import  levies,  however
23
increased exports caused by increased production turned EU into a net exporter
and export subsidies became the biggest spending category. In addition to that
the  budget  was  heavily taking  the  burden  of  storage and  destruction  cost  of
surpluses.  In  the  80s  the  Community  gave  farmers  co-responsibility  for
surpluses,  introduced  quota  system  to  get  rid  of  the  milk  lake  caused  by
overproduction in dairy sector and imposed restrictive policies for most of the
products. However these measures mostly affected small farmers, therefore the
production level didn’t decrease much.
In 1988,  budget  ceiling23 and  stabilizers  were  introduced to  control  the
share  of  CAP  in  EC  budget.  Newly  set  production  thresholds  to  cut  prices
automatically were another effective measure. 
During the 1990s trainings to farmers, early retirement schemes for small
farmers, financial assistance for younger farmers, investments for modernizing
farm  holdings  and  programmes  for  less-favored  and  mountain  areas  were
introduced. 
In  1992,  the  McSharry  reform  tried  to  address  these  problems  by
decoupling income payments from price policy. This way the price policy would
be arranged efficiently and production control measures would be adjusted to
avoid overproduction. Farmers’ incomes would be secured by direct payments
rather than payments coupled to production. Since the social rationale of CAP
makes  the  policy  very  resistant  to  protests,  the  Community  was  entitled  to
introduce rather conservative changes step by step (Wieger, 2002). 
Following  these  reforms,  CAP tend  to  become  partially renationalized,
since  renationalization  is  an  effective  device  to  solve  problems  during
enlargement rounds. The changing objectives and constraints of CAP as well as
the dominant national interests only justified these trends. Besides at that stage of
Europeanization, CAP no longer served as a core element of integration.   
Internal  problems causing the evolution of  CAP were shadowed by the
pressure of WTO negotiations, trying to harmonize diverse regimes and bring
agricultural trade under GATT rules.  External pressures for a more competitive
agricultural  market  joined  with  internal  pressures  from  the  consumers  and
environmentalist  for  safe  goods triggered another  set  of  reforms.  On 26th  of
March 1999,  AGENDA 2000 was presented to  the Berlin European Council,
23 Since 1988 CAP spending cannot rise faster than 74% of Union’s GDP.
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putting forward a set of measures for increased competitiveness, environmental
considerations, fair income distribution, simplified legislation and decentralized
application of legislation together with a new regulation on rural development,
named the 2nd pillar of CAP (See Annex I for the Agenda 2000 proposals and
the Berlin compromise on main agricultural products).  1st  pillar consisting of
traditional CAP measures was to be financed by Community budget, whereas the
2nd pillar required co-financement from the member states (EPPA, 2003). 
Further reforms on CAP were set  aside until  the midterm review of the
Commission, which was presented in 200324. Although this review was presented
after the completion of enlargement negotiations, the objectives for future were
already clear during the negotiation process. The midterm review suggested total
decoupling of farm payments from production,  criteria on payments based on
environmental,  food  safety,  animal  safety  and  occupational  conditions,  20%
decrease in direct payments over seven years, a maximum amount of 300.000€
on annual  farm payments per farmer and 5% cut  in the intervention price of
cereals. This set of proposals are nor only radical, they also seek a compromise
between France and Germany. While the proposal considers direct payments an
integral  part of agricultural policy as France wishes,  it  also introduces a long
anticipated  reform in  CAP according to  Germany’s  expectations.  France  and
Germany reached a final agreement on this proposal on 24th of October 2002 and
decided to freeze agricultural spending from 2007 on based on the level reached
in  2006.  Reform  on  direct  payments  was  postponed  to  the  next  budget
negotiations (Roenderer-Rynning, 2003).
In June 2003, EU farm ministries came up with a fundamental reform of
CAP.  Finally  CAP  will  become  a  more  market-oriented  policy  by  total
decoupling of subsidies from production. Member states will still be able to link
subsidies  to  production  within  clearly defined  limits,  in  order  to  shape  their
national agriculture policy. The new system of “single farm payment” will be
based on environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. Payment to
large bigger farms will also be cut in order to support rural development policies.
24 The  reason for  postponing further  reforms is  not  only the  need for  a
midterm  review on the  agricultural  situation  of  the  Union  but  also  the
bargaining power the EU has over Poland as well as member states with
particular  interest  in  CAP.  Also  the  outcomes  of  the  Convention
negotiations, which would define the institutional reform of the EU would
also have a direct effect on the future of major policy areas such as CAP. 
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Concerning common organization of the market, asymmetric price cuts in milk
sector will be combined with reduction of the monthly increments in the cereals
sector by half and reforms in rice, durum wheat, nuts, potato starches and dried
fodder sectors.  
EU paves the way towards reducing the social welfare functions of CAP
and shifting it towards a more market friendly policy. This urge from the market
as  well  as  the  pressures  from  WTO  for  a  more  liberal  agricultural  policy25
provided the EU with a stronger position during the enlargement negotiations.
EU did not want to allow the candidate states to enjoy the payment schemes of
CAP without  investing into  rural  restructuring.  Despite  the fact  that  the  new
comers have more urgent problems than reaching the EU level on environmental
and health standards, they were obliged to do so. However Poland managed to
convince the EU for several transition periods for these standards. 
25 WTO negotiations are managed by the European Commission. They are
one  of  the  few  occasions  were  the  EU  is  represented  solely  on
supranational level, which enhances powers of the Commission. However
it has a very difficult task, since national interests have to be protected in a
very restrictive environment.
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CHAPTER 3
PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE
This  chapter  will  first  introduce  basic  information  on  Poland  and  its
motives for enlargement. Afterwards activities undertaken by Poland and the EU
before  the  negotiations  will  be  explained.  Pre-negotiation  stage  consists  of
activities  undertaken  by  both  parties,  which  prepare  them  to  the  actual
negotiation  stage  (Zartman,  1989).  In  the  context  of  EU  enlargement,  such
activities  could  be  divided  into  two  phases;  informal  and  formal  activities.
Informal activities by Poland and EU try to bring Poland closer to the EU. They
are not informal by structure; however they are not part of the institutionalized
enlargement  negotiations.  On the  other  hand,  activities  under  the  heading  of
formal  pre-negotiation  activities  are  the  set  activities,  which  are  part  of  the
accession process. 
3.1. About Poland
Poland has  been committed  to becoming a  part  of the European Union
since the end of the Cold War. The country has suffered external security threat
since the times of its first King Mieszko I (940-992) and wanted to be a part of
an alliance, which would not only protect its security, but also help sustaining its
democratic order and contribute to a modern civic society in Poland (Friss et al.,
1999).  Between  the  16th and  18th centuries  Poland  was  a  quasi-democratic
country with the ‘one vote per one noble person’ system. Its past with democracy
served as a strong argument to the EU member states to consider Poland as a part
of the European family.
There are two key events in the 20th century concerning Poland. The first
one is the partitions of the country by Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union
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during the World War II. During the war 6 million Poles; about one fifth of the
population were killed. Second key event is the Yalta agreement among Britain,
US, and the Soviet Union following the WW II, which attached Poland to the
Soviet Union with the status of a satellite state (Taras, 2002). This agreement
started  an  era  of  Sovietization  in  Poland;  however  at  the  end  the  desire  for
independence prevailed. The movement towards independence was born  from
the trade union movement, Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa. Solidarity became a
social  movement  of  10 million  people  between the  years of  1980 and 1981.
Failing  economy  in  the  region  helped  to  strengthen  Solidarity,  therefore  it
became a serious threat to the regime and was claimed as illegal (see table III for
the indices of economic change in Poland). Solidarity pushed its way to the top
step  by step.  First  the  movement  entered  a  round  table  negotiation  with  the
communist ruling to have itself represented at the Sejm (the Parliament). Later it
entered the elections in 1989 and won. However, the third step was another set of
negotiations with the communist fraction, in order to reach a balance between the
old and the new to ensure stability. From then on Poland oriented itself fully
towards the West and entered into trade agreements with the European Union.
After the Cold War Poland turned its back to the East economically and relied on
Europe for a rapid and sustainable economic development in expectation of full
membership. On the other hand European Union striving for a joint action in
Europe relied on a boost on the European economy with the expansion of the
Single Market to Poland and other new coming countries. 
Currently Poland has a great growth dynamism but suffers under poverty.
19% of its population is in agricultural sector and it has a competitive market in
milk, cereals and meat. Its farming has an archaic structure composed of small
farms and the agricultural  sector is  rather resistant  to  change,  since it  wasn’t
under  control  even  during  the  communist  period  of  Poland.  Poland  has  a
traditional heavy industry and a developed private sector. Banking, insurance and
telecommunication sectors do not comply with the competition standards of the
EU and are therefore problematic. 
Poland had a high growth rate and a decreasing inflation rate between 1995
and 1997, however  there was a strong regional  differentiation concerning the
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allocation of transformation benefits  on the way to the EU. According to the
family budget  data,  blue-collar  workers,  worker-farmers  and  farmers  had  the
same income level, whereas white-collar workers and self-employed increased
their income. Declining agricultural incomes caused greater protests in Poland in
1998.  Since  trade unions  and farmers  are  very strong pressure  groups in  the
parliament, these protests caused a great confusion in the country. The church,
which was forced out of the political arena in the 1990s, re-appeared to mediate
between the government and farmers’ unions (Blazyca, 1999).
The long term effects of EU accession onto the above mentioned picture of
Poland  are  calculated  by  independent  Polish  research  institutions  upon  the
request  of the Committee  of  European Integration.  The report  proposes  three
theses.  Firstly,  Poland  did  not  finalize  its  economic  transition  and  several
additional structural reforms are necessary. Therefore any calculations of costs
and benefits  should take the development process into account.  Secondly, the
opportunities provided by the EU could be reflected to the macro economy of
Poland if suitable domestic economic policies are employed  Last but not least, a
distinction has to be made between real costs and costs incurred for the sake of
the measures for development.
The report stresses that Poland will enjoy the benefits of the Single Market
as well as the financial credibility and attractiveness for foreign direct investors
as an EU member. There will be a net money transfer from the EU budget as
well, which adds up to 0.6-1% of the GDP between 2004-2006 and to 3.5% of
the GDP in 2010. Poland will also participate at the Exchange Rate Mechanism
II  and  join  the  euro  zone  in  2008  (The  Office  of  Committee  of  European
Integration, 2003). 
One of the greatest obstacles for Poland on the way to the EU was its large
but inefficient agricultural sector. Developed countries of the EU have less and
less  percentage contributions  from agricultural  sector  to  their  GDP.  Also the
employment  in  this  sector  is  decreasing.  However,  in  Poland  38,3  %  of  its
population; approximately 40 million are living in rural areas and 19% of the
population is registered as employed in the agricultural sector.  Agricultural land
and forests make up 90% of the country. Land productivity is four times lower
than the average EU level not only due to the average soil quality in Poland and
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the climate, but also due to lower use of fertilizers and plant production products.
Share of agriculture in GDP is also declining in Poland due to the lack of growth
in agricultural production and expansion of other sectors (see table II). 
Table II. Share  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Hunting  to  the  GDP  in
percentages:
Therefore, the Polish government is not only interested in increasing the
welfare  of  its  large  agrarian  population,  but  also  shrink  the  number  of  this
population and re-channel them to other economically significant sectors with a
higher share in GDP.
3.2. Informal Phase of Pre-Negotiations
There are two types of activities in the informal part of the pre-negotiation
phase; firstly the Europe Agreement between Poland and the EU, which brought
both  parties  closer  to  each  other  through  economic  cooperation  and
harmonization.  Secondly  institutional  and  legal  reforms  in  Poland  based  on
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Polish or Polish-EU initiatives could be considered as pre-negotiation activities,
since they serve as the initial steps towards harmonization of Polish legal and
institutional system to the acquis. 
3.2.1. Europe Agreement
In the aftermath of the Cold War, EU was urged to design a strategic plan
and  a  policy  towards  its  Eastern  neighbors.  Preparation  of  Poland  to  EU
accession was strongly influenced by these plans and policies. First years of the
post-cold war period was got by with short term actions such as technical and
financial  assistance  for  increasing  trade  by  harmonizing  the  regulations  and
instruments  between  the  member  states  and  the  eastern  neighbors.  These
activities strongly protected sensitive areas such as agriculture, steel, coal and
textiles in favor of the EU member states and included anti-dumping measures
for eastern neighbors. However, individual member states took more active and
committed role towards Eastern Europe.
Germany’s  close  relations  with  Poland  after  1989  in  parallel  with
Germany’s Ostpolitik26 increased trade relations of Germany with Poland as well
as Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The impact of Ostpolitik in strengthening the
ties between Poland and Germany is still visible in the recent figures of trading
between these countries. Germany is the number one trading partner of Poland
within the EU and covers more than fifty percent of its trade in most sectors. 
Bulletin of the European Communities in December 1989 summarized the
Eastern  policy  as  the  ending  of  division  of  the  continent  and  support  for
transformation  in  Eastern  Europe.  However  one  of  the  motivations  for  joint
action  from the  European  community was  the  skepticism  of  France  and UK
26 Germany always  had  strong  historical  and  economic  ties  to  Poland.
Franco-German rapprochement  was the  founding block of the  European
Union  and  these  two  countries  were  and  still  are  the  motors  of  the
Community.  The  comparison  between the Franco-German axis  with  the
Polish-German partnership stresses the importance of this country for the
whole Eastern wave of new comers (Zaborowski, 2002).
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towards  German  dominance  in  the  East  (Wallace,  2000).  As  a  sign  of  joint
Community action, the European Commission took a leading role and prepared
the Trade and Cooperation Agreements with the CEEC. The Commission also
coordinated the aids from G24, developed Western European countries according
to an Action Plan set up in 1989. The priority of the Action Plan was economic
transformation;  however  in  1992  European  Parliament  pushed  for  a  social
dimension and included a budget line for democracy building (Wallace, 2000). 
These first steps of getting closer to CEEC were largely planned by the
European Community.  The  asymmetry in  the  relationship  gave the  European
Community the space to set the tone and measures of the relationship. However
the  CEEC  pushed  for  sustainable  and  long term policies  rather  than  ad  hoc
measures. Therefore the European Community offered a more extensive tool of
cooperation and convergence; the Europe Agreements. Europe Agreements are
trade agreements supported by some financial and technical assistance measures.
They were only offered to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, since they were
more advanced in the transformation of their economies.  This move showed that
the Community was more interested in deepening than widening27. 
Poland’s accession road started with the Europe Agreement  as the first
institutionalized  effort  to  bring  Polish  market  closer  to  the  EU  market.
Negotiations on the acquis aim to harmonize EU law with the national law in
areas under the EU competence. Therefore Europe agreements28, which started to
27 Following the Iberian enlargement, European Community entered into a
phase  of  adjusting  its  policies  and  institutions  to  a  larger  European
Community. This  way EC aimed to increase its  economic and political
power  as  a  union.  This  phase  is  referred  to  as  the  deepening  of  the
European Community whereas widening refers to the different waves of
enlargement. 
28 Negotiations  on Europe agreements  were an important  experience  for
both  Poland  and  the  European  Union.  The  Community  experienced
difficulties  in  aligning  the  interests  of  its  constituencies  with  the
expectations of the CEEC. CEEC pushed the Community to add a close to
the agreements to secure their accession once they comply with the market
harmonisation  as  planned  within  the  agreements.   Although  the
negotiations for the Europe Agreements started in December 1990, they
were blocked twice in 1991, when the CEEC countries refused to send
high-level representatives. The Commission acted as the mediator pushing
the Council for better offers to the CEEC and trying to convince CEEC to
come  in  terms  with  the  Councils  main  positions.  However  the  final
outcome was not very satisfactory for the CEEC. Europe Agreements did
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transform Polish law in line with the EU legislation on common market, should
be considered as an informal part of the pre-negotiation phase.  
Europe  Agreement  is  another  form  of  association  agreement  based  on
‘stand  still’  principle  and  asymmetry  in  Poland’s  favor  since  within  the
framework  of  the  agreement,  EU  would  lower  its  custom  duties  faster  than
Poland except for the sensitive sectors, which sum up to 50% of Poland’s exports
to the EU. Other sectors, where Polish export figures were high; EU imposed
other measures such as anti-damping regulations, safeguard clauses, competition
and  state  aid  rules.  Europe  Agreement  addressed  the  issue  of  movement  of
workers,  asking for non-discrimination of Polish workers in  the EU and vice
versa  as  well  as  including  steps  to  provide  for  mutual  recognition  of
qualification. Priority was given to legal areas facilitating economic convergence
of Poland to the EU market economy (Preston, 2000). The Europe Agreement
covered an evolution clause, which allowed the extension of the agreement in
certain  areas  from  Poland’s  national  treatment,  upon  Polish  request  at  the
Association  Council.  Therefore  adjustments  of  Polish  legislation  to  the  EU
would allow Poland to benefit more from the agreement.
Europe  Agreement  facilitated  the  opening  up  of  Polish  economy  and
changed its trade patterns westwards. The GDP share of trade was 34% in 1989
and it increased to 51% in 1996. However, it  also stressed the fact that trade
liberalization  depends  on  domestic  reforms.  For  example,  the  World  Bank
criticized  Poland  for  distortions  in  ad  hoc  management  of  quotas  and  tariff
exceptions, technical barriers to trade, the use of safeguards and the structure of
tariffs (World Bank, 1997). On the other hand, the EU was strongly criticized for
protecting sensitive sectors in favor of the EU 15, restricting rules of origin and
for the complexity of the provisions on agriculture (Mizsei  & Rudko,  1995).
Additionally EU expected that the accession countries  fully adhere to the acquis,
however  did  not  elaborate  on  how they should  accomplish  this  aim.  Poland
didn’t have the space to adapt to the new system imposed by the EU, develop
response strategies as well as digest this development at the national level. 
not provide any link with future membership and liberalisation plan for
sensitive sectors was rather slow and limited. Sectors such as agriculture
are the main export bulk of CEEC and their protection hindered foreign
direct investments.
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Europe  Agreement  was  a  strong  tool  to  confront  the  national  interest
groups in  advance and assess  their  reactions.  On the  other  hand,  the  Europe
Agreements served as a tool of EU to impose their rules and norms to Poland and
other CEEC. Despite the favorable clauses in the agreements for the CEEC, the
Europe Agreement tied them to the European economic sphere and pushed for
massive structural changes. 
Implementation of the Europe Agreement resulted in increased investment
in Poland from multinationals, which put a pressure on the EU to accept Poland,
so  that  they will  have  easy access  to  the  EU market  for  goods  produced  in
Poland. 
The  Europe  Agreements  are  a  proof  of  how  sectoral  preference  and
fragmented  policy  processes  constrained  a  politically  motivated  agreement.
Despite their explicit statement of no link to actual membership, the EU had to
face  the  fact  that  the  Eastern  neighbors  would  not  be  satisfied  with  trade
agreements. During the implementation of the Europe Agreements, the CEEC
also increased its awareness about the shortcomings of these agreements. On the
other  hand,  events  in  the  Former  Yugoslavia  showed  the  cost  of  a  failed
transition in the East  was very high for the EU. Therefore, the EU could not
further keep its ‘take it or leave it’ position towards the CEEC (Sedelmeier &
Wallace, 2000).
3.2.2. Institutional and Legal Reforms in Poland
Following the applications  of the CEEC, the EU decided upon a set  of
criteria for candidate states at the European Council in Copenhagen29 (1993), in
order to  manage the enlargement process in an efficient  way. Poland applied
formally for EU membership in April 1994. Following its applications, Poland
had to go through a set of reforms both in its institutions and its legal system in
order to apply the acquis communutaire.   These reforms are mostly linked to
certain programmes and strategies devised by both EU and Polish authorities.
Hereby these reforms will be explained as part of the pre-negotiation phase in a
29 See page 4 for the Copenhagen criteria.
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chronological order.
In  December  1994,  at  the  Essen  Summit,  a  pre-accession  strategy was
devised by the European Council. The strategy focused on the internal market,
supported by a White Paper prepared by the Commission.  Madrid Summit  in
1995 set the date for the start of the negotiations as six months following the
next  Intergovernmental  Conference.  In  the  meantime,  Poland  filled  in  a
questionnaire of 170 pages in  23 areas,  in  order to  explain  its  situation with
regards to the compliance with the acquis and the Commission prepared its avis;
Opinion,  based  on  this  data.  The  questionnaire  focused  on  macro-economic
indicators, customs and tax policies, employment and welfare, state of industry
and  agriculture,  foreign  policy  and  security,  and  cooperation  possibilities  in
Justice and home affairs. Poland responded with an intensive study of its national
legislation, which summed up to 26 volumes and 2664 pages. This work was
accomplished by the ministries and central institutions of Poland in three months
time (April-June 1996) and was a serious exercise of cooperation and a rehearsal
for negotiation for these bodies. 
In 1997, Poland adopted its National Strategy for Integration (NSI). In the
same year, the Commission presented its Opinion within the frame of AGENDA
2000. The AGENDA 2000 did not only present the main objectives to strengthen
Community  policies  within  an  enlarged  Europe  and  the  new  financial
perspective,  but  also  expressed  Commission’s  Opinion  on  the  candidates.
According to AGENDA 2000, Poland has a strict  policy towards the EU and
implemented the Europe agreement successfully. It has advanced in harmonizing
its  laws  to  the  EU  legislation,  in  consolidating  its  democracy  with  stable
institutions as well as a functioning economy. Poland faces problems regarding
privatization of  certain  sectors  and downsizing the  agricultural  sector  is  very
large.  Its  justice  and  home affairs  system is  functioning properly.  By stating
these,  the  European  Commission  gave  the  green  light  to  Poland  to  start  the
enlargement negotiations.Based on the positive Opinion of the Commission, the
European Council in Luxembourg (1997) accepted Poland as a candidate country
to the EU and decided to start the negotiation process.
This decision was followed by the Accession Partnership between the EU
and Poland, combining all aids and the preparatory programmes according to a
schedule of implementation, in order to introduce the EU policies and procedures
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to Poland by involving the country to the Union programmes. Poland set up a
National Programme for the adoption of the acquis (March 1998) in line with the
short-, medium- and long-term priorities defined in the Accession Partnership.
Phare funds allocated to Poland for pre-accession assistance were allocated to
institution building (30%) and investment support (70%).
In  line  with  these  developments,  Poland  established  the  necessary
structures to manage, implement and monitor the agreements and programmes.
In 1998 The National Fund for Investment Promotion and Institution Building
was  established  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  in  order  to  manage  the  pre-
structural and agricultural funds. The Europe Agreement experience helped to
revise related bodies as well. The Office of the Secretary of State for European
Integration  was  resolved  in  October  1996  and  the  Committee  for  European
Integration  headed  by  the  Prime  Minister  was  established  instead.  The
Committee was composed of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Administration, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Labor and
Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Justice. The meetings
of  the  Committee  were  sometimes  attended  by  the  President  of  the  Polish
National Bank and the President of the Government Center of Strategic Studies. 
In  addition  to  these  implementation  and  monitoring  bodies,  Poland
established a special unit for negotiation; an inter-ministerial team30, in order to
prepare for the negotiations, which was composed of 18 members at the deputy
minister  level  with  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  chief  negotiator  Jan
Kulakowski31. 
30 However  Poland  suffered  under  political  influences  within  the
government, which shaded these appointments. The incompetence of some
official  in respective areas caused a loss of 34 million ECU from some
Phare  programmes.  Poland  had  extreme  difficulties  on  the  local
government level due to the lack of expertise on EU affairs in those levels
despite their strong role in the implementation of the necessary reforms.
Also  the  members  of  the  parliament  were  not  fully  equipped  with
knowledge on EU and Poland’s accession. They were strongly influences
by national interest groups. While the euro-sceptics and Euro-hostiles such
as the farmers  feared competition in agricultural sector as a result of EU
accession,  right  wing  parties  and  Christian  democrats  underlines  the
national  identity  and  values  with  the  fear  of  degenerative  effect  of
Westernization (Stawarska,1999).
31 Born on 25 August 1930 at Myszkow (Silesian Voivodeship), completed
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3.3. Formal Phase:
Formal events and procedures on the European level for all candidates of
the pre-negotiation phase are demonstrated in the following table:
law studies at the University of Leuven. In 1953, he attained the degree of
Doctor  of  Law  at  the  Catholic  University  of  Leuven
(http://www.polonya.org.tr/kulak_bio_eng.html).
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TABLE III Formal Pre-negotiation Phase of Enlargement Negotiations
DATE & EVENT OUTCOME
European  Council  –
Maastricht; 1991
Decision  to  analyse  the  impact  of
enlargement  as  a  response  to  the
formal applications for membership of
CEEC, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey
Lisbon  Summit  –  Lisbon,
1992
Commission report stating that EFTA
countries,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Turkey and
CEEC are eligible for membership
European  Council  –
Copenhagen; June 1993
Introduction of Copenhagen Criteria
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DATE & EVENT OUTCOME
Internal  negotiations  on
different  strategies  of  pre-
accession (1993-1994)
-  Commission's  offer:  inclusive  and
progressive  formula  for  improved
trade  opportunities  through
liberalization  of  agriculture,  limited
use of commercial defense instruments
and  more  effective  use  of  Phare
programme in line with the example of
structural  funds.  However  agriculture
is one of the most sensitive sectors in
the  EU  and  its  liberalization  was
strongly  objected  by  some  member
states. 
-  UK  and  Italy's  offer:  political
dialogue  through involving  CEEC in
Second  pillar,  Common  Foreign  and
Security  Policy  and  Third  pillar;
Justice and Home Affairs. 
- France and Spain's offer: France and
Spain  were  still  worried  about  the
peace  and  security  in  the
Mediterranean  and  pushed  for  a
programme  covering  the
Mediterranean countries, which would
integrate  economic,  political  and
security dimensions.
-  Final  Offer:  “Structured  dialogue”
between  EU  institutions  and  the
candidates,  aiming  to  integrate  the
candidates  to  the  single  market
through regulatory alignment.
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DATE & EVENT OUTCOME
European  Council  –  Corfu,
June 1994
-  Decision  for  the  preparation  of  a
White Paper on internal market by the
Commission,  which  would  guide  the
member  states  in  establishing  the
necessary structures and legislation. 
-  Decision  for  a  Mediterranean
Programme as proposed by France and
Spain,  which  covered  all  countries
around the Mediterranean sea. 
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DATE & EVENT OUTCOME
European Council  –  Madrid,
Dec 1995
Madrid  European  Council  planned
concrete  steps  to  start  with  the
negotiations. It asked the Commission
to  present  its  opinion  on  the
candidates,  prepare  a  report  on  the
impact  of enlargement,  which should
cover the financial perspective as well
and  propose  indicative  dates  for  the
start  of  negotiations  with  CEEC,
Cyprus  and  Malta32 (Council  of  the
European Union 1995b:23).
32 The  tricky  step  following  these  decisions  was  the  choice  about
differentiating between member states or treating them on equal footing.
Germany already favored the Visagrad countries, whereas Greece   pushed
for  the start  with  negotiations  with  Cyprus in  return  of  removal  of  her
blockage  against  progress  in  Customs  Union  with  Turkey.  Spanish
Presidency managed a deal supporting equal treatment of all candidates.
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DATE & EVENT OUTCOME
European  Council  –
Luxembourg, Dec, 1997
Presentation of Commission's Opinion
within  AGENDA  200033  and  the
decision  of  the  Council  to  start  the
negotiations with Poland
The  formal  pre-negotiation  process  starts  with  the  Opinion  of  the
Commission,  which  underlines  legislative  areas  to  deal  with  during  the
negotiation process. Opinion is followed by the formal decision of the Council in
Luxembourg for the starting date of the negotiations. The formal pre-negotiation
phase defined by the EU starts with the screening process and the presentation of
the acquis to the candidate state. Candidate states prepare their initial positions to
the 31 chapters already at this pre-negotiation stage. After the date is set,  the
Commission starts with the screening of the Polish legislation in detail, which
started  in  31st of  March 1998 in  the  Polish  case.  Screening  is  the  analytical
examination of the convergence of Polish legislation to the EU acquis andit starts
with the easiest chapters. While some chapters like education and statistics were
finalized  within  months,  screening  of  the  agriculture  chapter  started  in
September 1998 and lasted until June 1999. Poland submitted its first negotiation
position on agriculture in November 1998. Formal negotiations on this chapter
started in June 2000, when the common position of the European Union was
presented at the Luxembourg Summit. 
Financial measures facilitating the convergence of the Polish agricultural
legislation continued during the negotiations. On April 6th  2000, Poland and EU
agreed upon the SAPARD34 funding scheme, which allocated 171 mi € to Poland
33 In  its  AGENDA  2000,  the  Commission  proposed  a  differentiated
approach towards the candidates, since each had varied distances to full
compliance with the acquis. AGENDA 2000 not only evaluated the impact
of enlargement in  different policy areas of the EU, it  also gave a more
concrete shape to the entire process. It even proposed a specific time-table,
which foresaw 2002 as an optimistic date of accession for the first wave
candidates. 
34 SAPARD aims to provide Community support for agriculture and rural
development during the pre-accession period in the applicant countries of
central  and  eastern  Europe  (Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), in
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on an annual  basis  for the improvement of its  market  efficiency in agri-food
sector  and  the  improvement  of  conditions  for  economic  activities  and  job
creation. 
order  to  contribute  to  the  implementation  of  the  acquis  communautaire
concerning  the  common  agricultural  policy  and  related  policies  and  to
resolve priority and specific problems for the sustainable adaptation of the
agricultural  sector  and  rural  areas  in  the  applicant  countries
(http://www.europa.eu.int/grants/grants/sapard/sapard_en.htm).
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CHAPTER 4
NEGOTIATIONS
This  chapter  will  discuss  the  basic  characteristics  of  enlargement
negotiations, which will help to get a clearer picture of the negotiation process
and  to  contribute  to  the  assessment  of  the  outcomes.  It  will  start  with  the
description  of  basic  characteristics  of  enlargement  negotiations.   Then,  the
chapter will study the agriculture negotiations using the theoretical frameworks
introduced in  the  first  chapter.  Finally,  in  the  last  section  of  the  chapter  the
outcomes of the agriculture negotiations will be evaluated based on the stated
characteristics.
4.1. Characteristics of Enlargement Negotiations
Enlargement negotiations can be characterized as follows:
Power Asymmetry: Enlargement negotiations are asymmetric negotiations,
because the candidate countries, as the outsiders, have to comply with the pre-set
rulers  of  the  insiders.  EU's  economic  power  is  a  major  reason  causing  this
asymmetry.  Secondly as  far  as  Poland is  concerned,  Poland does  not  have  a
viable  alternative,  a  satisfactory Best  Alternative  to  a  Negotiated  Agreement
(BATNA)35 to being a member of the EU. In the post cold war era, Poland turned
its  face completely towards  the EU and its  welfare  depends on its  economic
relations with the EU countries. On the other hand, the EU is in a position to
form less beneficial alternative scenarios such as extended economic cooperation
35 Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement is  an alternative that  the
negotiator can choose in case all negotiated outcomes are less favorable
than the BATNA. BATNA of the party is crucial to determine the power of
the respective party. The stronger the alternative to a negotiated settlement
the stronger is the party, since the party can leave the negotiation table with
a strong alternative already existing.
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with its neighbors in other forms than actual membership. In the case of EFTA
enlargement,  the  candidate  countries  had  a  stronger  hand,  since  they  were
developed countries already enjoying economic agreements with the EU.
EU has  a  rather  complex  set  of  institutionalized  rules  and  regulations,
which set up the acquis. Most new comers have to commit immense efforts to
get  accustomed  with  this  giant  package  of  information  and  knowhow.  This
knowhow is mostly required to increase the issue-specific power of the parties
(Habeeb, 1988)36 to create linkages between issues serving for more satisfactory
solutions. So, there is an asymmetry in terms of know-how and technical skills as
well while dealing with the acquis. 
Nothing is decided until everything is decided: According to this principle,
the EU enjoys the flexibility to re-open any negotiation chapter when it wishes if
it  observes  implementation problems  throughout  the  process.  As  the  General
Affairs  Council  put  it:  “It  [the  Council]  recalled  that  the  principle  that
agreements-even  partial  agreements-reached  during  the  course  of  the
negotiations may not be considered as final until an overall agreement has been
established.” (General Affairs Council, 06.10.1998) This what do you refer to by
this here? is a rather tricky issue for Poland, since EU is evolving every day.
Institutional and policy changes are occurring constantly; therefore EU is called a
moving target (Friss, 1999). 
Post  negotiation:   EU  negotiations  are  still  characterized  by  national
preferences, since the implementation of the negotiated agreements are mostly
left to the member states. Many decisions taken in negotiations at the EU level
concern issues in the past,  the present, and the future. Therefore the demands
from the negotiated agreements have increased. EU has the habit of relying on
package deals to satisfy many parties at the same time; however it is becoming
more and more difficult  to  create convincing packages in the nest  of diverse
interests.  Therefore  many  important  negotiations  are  concluded  with  broad
statements  and  final  decisions  are  postponed  (Friss,  1998).  Post-negotiation
36 According  to  Habeeb  aggregate  structural  power  generates  from
economic and political strengths and resources of a party, where as issue-
specific  structural  power  is  concerned  with  the  actors’  capacities  and
resources  with  respect  to  a  specific  issue.  Behavioral  power  is  the
competence  over  the  process  and  the  relevant  tactics,  to  maneuver  the
negotiations towards the preferred outcome (Habeeb, 1988).
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phases  of  different  agreements  could  also  serve  as  pre-negotiation  stages  for
other  related  issues;  such  as  the  Europe  Agreement  post-negotiations,  which
turned out to be pre-negotiations for accession to the EU.
Due to the complexity of enlargement negotiations, it could be expected
that  many  critical  decisions  would  be  left  to  the  post-negotiation  phase.
However,  this  means that  major problems are very likely to emerge later  on.
Once the candidate states become EU members, they will not only have the right
to effect decisions of the EU according to their national interests; they will also
face the complexity of the system more closely. For these reasons the EU had a
strong motive to satisfy the candidate states as much as possible, so that they
would not form coalitions among each other after accession, in order to re-open
the negotiations indirectly by pushing for changes in their favor in the legislation,
institutional  balance,  or  the  budget  of  the  EU.  For  example,  Convention
negotiations were a proof of the importance of the post-negotiation phase and the
value of the voting power after accession. Convention negotiations were highly
dominated by disagreements on the voting power of each member state within an
enlarged  Europe.  For  example,  Poland,  in  alliance  with  Spain,  caused  the
breakdown of the Brussels Summit in December 2003, which aimed the adoption
of the Draft Constitution, due to their disagreement with the Convention formula
for Qualified Majority Voting. More and more decisions on the European level
are taken by qualified majority voting; so the voting system determines also the
power of that member state within the EU decision making system. Therefore,
this is an example for an occasion in which Poland  can use its post-negotiation
power. Poland managed to secure its power in the Union’s decision making37.
Post-negotiation  phase  could  be  abused  by  the  EU  15  as  the  Europe
Agreement example shows. First, Poland suffered from delays in the ratification
37 Nice Formula according to the Treaty of Nice (26 Feb. 2001) defines a
triple  majority  system.  For  EU-27  firstly  member  states  are  allocated
certain  weights  proportional  to  their  population.  According  to  this  new
weighting Poland has a weight of 27, whereas four biggest EU states had
29. Secondly the weight of the total votes need to reach a quota of 74% to
pass a bid and thirdly two extra conditions were added, according to which
the bid has to be supported by the majority of the member states and 62%
of the total population of the EU.  On the other hand Convention proposed
to scrap the degressive weighting and asks for a double majority; majority
of member states and 60% of the total EU population (Felsenthal, D and
Machover, M., 2004). 
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of the Europe Agreement, as a result of which the agreement entered into force
one year later than planned. Second, freedoms provided in favor of Poland were
limited  during  the  implementation  of  Europe  agreement  clauses  by  various
means. Freedom of movement of workers was managed according to bilateral
agreements  between  the  member  states  and  Poland.  For  example,  Germany
preferred to control the documents of Polish workers in Germany and arrange the
quota of the Polish workers considering the ones already residing in Germany
rather than increasing the quota. Germany also changed its social legislation for
certain  professions  such  as  doctors,  in  order  to  prevent  Polish  doctors  from
practicing in Germany.  
Nested games: EU negotiations in general are complex, since most of the
time there are historical  package deals,  ongoing games or future prospects in
sectoral  or  institutional  issues  among member  states.  Many issues  negotiated
with the candidate countries affect these deals directly or indirectly, therefore it
is very time and energy consuming to come up with satisfactory outcomes. These
outcomes are usually conservative and sub-optimal not only due to the historical
package deals, but also due to the complex decision making system. There are
always  multiple  interests,  issues  and  parties  involved  in  the  negotiations;
therefore  they turn  out  to  become nested  games  (Tsebelis,  1991)  among  the
member states, the candidates and the secondary parties involved.
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4.2. Study of the Negotiations on the Chapter of Agriculture
The chapter on agriculture,  which is  one of the most  complex chapters
among the 31 chapters of the acquis, could be divided into three major issues
subject to negotiations:
1. Direct payments: As explained in the second chapter, agriculture is a major heading in the EU
budget. New comers with large agrarian populations faced resistance from net contributors to the
budget. Decision about the inclusion of candidate states to the direct aid schemes within the CAP
was a hot agenda topic.
2. Quotas:  Quotas  aim to limit  the production of certain agricultural  products  and force Poland
towards a restructuring of a rather inefficient sector in line with the EU policies. Quotas also
determine the number of people making their living from agriculture. Setting quotas below the
existing production level means forcing farmers in that specific sector out. Therefore quotas have
to be evaluated with respect to their impact on social welfare.
3. Preparatory,  transitory or  permanent  measures:  Chapter  on  agriculture  is  not  only limited  to
farming, but also covers the whole agri-food industry, institutions serving these sectors, veterinary
services,  Agricultural  Market  Agency38 and  Integrated  Administration  and  Control  System39.
Relevant measures are categorized as follows:
a. General issues 
b. Common organization  of particular markets
c. Structural policy, rural areas development and forestry
d. Veterinary matters
e. Phytosanitary issues
In the next section, negotiations on these issues will be analyzed based on
primary  resources  produced  by  the  Polish  government  and  the  EU.  After
explanation of the program, initial positions and strategies of both parties will be
38 The Agricultural Market Agency (AMA) is a state agency. Its mission is
to implement the state agricultural interventionist policies and protecting
economic  interests  of  agricultural  producers,  organizational  structure,
advisory council, activities  (http://www.arr.gov.pl/eng/eng_ramki.htm).
3939 IACS is a soft ware system member states have to establish in order to
manage the introduction of CAP measures.  
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presented.  The  offers  and  counter-offers  will  be  traced  from  regular  reports
and/or Council conclusions whenever possible. The outcome of the negotiations
will be presented based on the Act of Accession. Last but not least, the outcome
will be discussed based on its stability, distance from the opening position and
distribution of resources40. 
4.2.1.  Negotiations On Direct Payments: 
Negotiation Problem: 
CAP supports  farmers  through direct  payments  in  order  to  secure  their
level of income and production. These payments are made from the European
Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Funds.  Poland would like to receive full
payments as the current member states. This problem is linked to the issue about
production quotas, since direct cash flow is linked to quotas in certain sectors. 
Negotiation Positions:
Poland:  Poland  would  like  to  ensure  direct  aid  schemes  applied  to  its
farmers  at  the  maximum  level.  Poland  requests  full  payments  from the  EU
budget. 
EU: EU would like to avoid that all developed EU countries sponsor the
economic development of new comers in agricultural sector through the CAP
measures due to its large expenses. Thus, EU would like to avoid full payments
to Poland. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland:  Poland  would  like  to  be  treated  as  a  regular  EU member  and
considers its exclusion from direct payments schemes as discriminatory as well
as harmful to its competitiveness in agricultural trade. 
EU: Poland has a large agrarian population and a very inefficient farming
industry. Therefore applying direct payment scheme to Poland as well as to other
candidate states having similar economic structure would be too costly for EU 15
member  states,  especially  the  net  contributors.  Additionally  current  member
states with large agricultural market have reservations to give the new comers
40 Efficiency of the outcome will not be discussed since the general remarks
made on chapter 4 are valid for all outcomes. 
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full benefits of financial assistance from EU budget, which would increase their
competitive power. Therefore in its AGENDA 2000, the Commission presented
a financial framework for the budgetary years 2000-2006, which did not include
direct payments to the new comers. 
Offers and Counter-offers:  
On 30.01.2002 Commission in its  Communication proposed to phase in
direct payments and production quotas from 2004 on. According to this proposal,
Poland would not receive full payments, however would gain access to the direct
payment scheme gradually by receiving 25% in the year 2004, 35% in 2005, 40%
in 2006 and from 2007 10% increase each year until the candidate states would
get  100%  direct  payment  in  the  year  2013.  Commission’s  main  arguments
against  full  payment  were  that  these  payments  would  cause  preservation  of
existing agricultural structure in Poland, hamper modernization of agricultural
holdings and create social inequalities. Farmers would be in a state of welfare
thanks to the direct aid schemes and therefore be less inclined to restructuring
their  system.  The European Council  in  December 12th,  2002 at  Copenhagen
approved this proposal of phasing in direct payments within the period of 2004-
2013.
However, on the 13th of December 2003, the Council was called by Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia, in order to increase the percentages of
the gradual payments.  Candidate states claimed that rural development measures
agreed upon  would  create  positive  effects  on  the  restructuring  of  the  Polish
agriculture. Additionally Poland would suffer from the impact of direct payments
on input prices as well as changes in CAP market measures. Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic and Slovenia presented these side affects of accession on the
agricultural sector to the member states. 
The European Council agreed to increase the percentages, however insisted
that  the  extra  amount  should  be  covered  from  funds  allocated  to  rural
development.  The  Council  also  pushed  for  the  application  of  the  20%  co-
financement  rule  for  these  extra  percentages,  which  meant  a  partial
renationalisation of payments. EU also agreed to allow national top-up payments,
so that the candidate states could increase their level of competition. 
Outcomes: 
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According to the Act of Accession payment scheme for 2004-200641 is as
follows:
 For the year of 2004 Poland will receive 33,8% of the total amount for direct aid scheme from the
EU budget and has to contribute at least 2,2% to the budget as co-financement. Poland is allowed
to top up the direct aid scheme from other resources up to a level of 55%. 
 For the year of 2005, Poland will receive 37,2% of the total amount for direct aid scheme from the
EU budget and has to contribute at least 1,8% to the budget as co-financement. Poland is allowed
to top up the direct aid scheme from other resources up to a level of 60%. 
 For the year of 2006, Poland will receive 40,6% of the total amount for direct aid scheme from the
EU budget and has to contribute at least 1,4% to the budget as co-financement. Poland is allowed
to top up the direct aid scheme from other resources up to a level of 65%. 
41 In 2006, Poland will have the chance to enter negotiations on the new
budget  for  the  term  2007-2013,  therefore  these  percentages  could  be
renegotiated for the years after 2006.
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Table IV  Percentages of Direct Aid Schemes from the EU Budget for New
Comers
2004 2005 2006
Funds  covered  by
EU
in %
33,8 37,2 40,6
Funds  covered  by
Poland in %
2,2 1,8 1,4
Maximum  amount
of top-ups in %
55 60 65
Evaluation of the outcome:
 Efficiency: Both parties were well informed about the direct aid system, since the data regarding
aids provided to member states as well as legislation concerning the allocation of these aids are
open to public information. 
 Stability:  Third  option  created  by  the  Commission,  based  on  a  gradual  payment  scheme  is
criticized not only due to its potential for conflicts raised by second class membership of the new
comers, but also due to the renationalisation by moving income support payments to the national
level. This outcome may encourage the new comers to show less willingness in implementing and
enforcing the EU legislation. On the other hand, full payments would facilitate the survival of
CAP and this policy is combated not only by the net contributors to the EU budget, but also by the
parties to the WTO negotiations. This also implies high costs for tax payers, which is a difficult
issue to present to the constituencies of all member states. Therefore, the third option tried to find
some kind of a balance between these different interests. However, if the new comers would not
adopt themselves to the priorities on the Community level and prefer to pursue their national
interests further as members of the EU, then they might form a coalition among each other to
change the budgetary setting and to have a strong saying on the reforms on CAP in the post-
negotiation phase. In the meanwhile, radical changes in CAP could occur, such as phasing out
direct payments from EU 15. Therefore the stability of this outcome is difficult to assess before
the real costs and benefits are experienced by both parties. 
 Distribution  of  resources:  In  the  end  result  Poland  will  be  receiving partial  direct  payments,
whereas  EU  15  are  still  entitled  to  full  payments,  therefore  the  resources  are  not  equally
distributed. On the other hand, it is important to note where these resources come from. Except
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for  Germany,  Austria,  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands,  all  other  EU  member  states  are  net
beneficiaries of the EU budget. Additionally, candidate states are not  expected to become net
contributors of the budget until the next budget negotiations. 
 Distance from the opening position: Poland was very strict with its initial position, however made
a remarkable concession by agreeing to a gradual participation in direct payment schemes. EU, on
the other hand, was more willing to have a compromise, but took a rather small step towards
Polish  position.  However,  considering  the  costs  of  larger  scale  concessions  from both  sides,
Poland is still close to its opening position. 
If we sum up the evaluation of the outcome, the EU's main interest was to
allocate minimum amount of financial measures under the CAP within the EU
budget to the new comers. Neither granting full access to direct aid schemes for
new comers  nor  excluding  them totally  were  considered  as  realistic  options.
Therefore,  both  parties  had  to  make concessions.  Poland accepted  to  have  a
gradual entry to CAP's financial mechanisms. This way EU made a rather small
concession by allowing a very slow entry to these mechanisms for Poland and
the other candidates. This outcome can be interpreted as a lopsided compromise,
which means that the EU made a small concession compared to Poland due to
the power asymmetry between the two parties.
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4.2.2. Negotiations on Quotas of Production:
Negotiation Problem: 
 EU sets certain quotas for the various items of agricultural production, in
order to shape the agricultural policy of the Union. They determine not only the
level of agricultural production, but also the amount of agricultural income and
the use of means of production used in agriculture. These quotas serve as a tool
for  the EU to  remain  within  the budgetary limits  as well,  since direct  aid is
coupled  with  production  level.  If  the  quota  is  set  for  a  lower  limit  than  the
existing production level, then some farmers are forced out of business. Poland
and the EU had to  agree upon these  quotas  of  production during the  acquis
negotiations. However, quotas have a different  level of importance in diverse
sectors. For example, dairy sector is rather strictly regulated according to pre-set
quotas for member states and farmers have to pay heavy charges if they exceed
their individual quotas42. Sugar quotas have also certain constraints. There are
three different quotas set for sugar production. Quota A is for sugar intended for
sale in a given member state. Quota B is sugar to be exported with the help of
export subsidies from EAGGF. Quota C, otherwise called as sugar outside quota
is for excess production exported at very low world level prices43 . Concerning
field crops; cereals, oilseeds, protein crops are sold in market price. Additionally,
farmers receive direct payments, which are calculated based on their production
area,  the  reference  yield  and  the  amount  of  direct  payment  for  the  specific
product44. 
The quota system is established only to manage the direct aid mechanism.
There  are  no  charges  for  over-production45,  however  when  farmers  produce
higher amounts of crops than their production limit, then they can only sell their
42 However individual quotas may be sold. UK supported sale of individual
quotas in order to support large industries (Rieger, 2000).
43 In  the  case  of  excess  production,  extra  delivery  is  cheaper  for  the
producer (Rawinski, 2003).
44 The Formula for the calculation of direct payments is as follows: Direct
payment= production area * reference yield * amount of direct payment for
the specific product.
45 Production limit is calculated as follows: 
Production limit=production area * reference yield.
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products  for  bare  market  prices  and  won’t  receive  any  direct  payments.
Otherwise,  the  farmer  can  also  apply formally for  payment  to  produce  in  a
greater area than national base area set for Poland. Yet, such a case is common
responsibility of all farmers, since they would be receiving proportionately lower
direct payments.
For products other than dairy, sugar and field crops, there are no severe
limitations, but still excess production won’t receive direct payments. Therefore
farmers  have  to  decide  for  themselves  if  excess  production  is  profitable
according to the market prices (Rabinski, 2003). 
Negotiation Positions 
EU presented its  position on the quotas in its AGENDA 2000, whereas
Poland presented its position in its Position Paper. Poland would like to have
high quotas for well established sectors, which employ great numbers of farmers.
Poland also wanted 1989-1991 as the base year for these calculations.On the
other hand, the EU insisted on the second half of 1990s to be considered as the
base year.
Field crops general: 
Poland: Poland requests to fix 9 263 000 ha. as its national quota on field
crops. 
EU: EU proposes 9 217 667 ha as the national quota on field crops
Reference Area:
Poland: Poland requests to set the reference area as 3.61 tonnes/ha.
EU: EU proposes 2.96 tonnes/ha as the reference area
Potato Starch:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 262 000 tons for potato starch.
EU: EU proposes a quota of 90 546 tons for potato starch.
Dry Fodder (tons):
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 160 000 tons for dry fodder.
EU: EU proposes a quota of 0 tons for dry fodder
Raw Tobacco (tons):
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 55 000 tons for raw tobacco.
EU: EU proposes a quota of 37 933 tons for raw tobacco.
Young bulls:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 2 200 000 units
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EU: EU proposes a quota of 857 700 units
Suckler cows: 
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 1 500 000 units
EU: EU proposes a quota of 325 581 units
Slaughter cattle:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 2 021 000 units
EU: EU proposes a quota of 1 034 300 units
Slaughter cows:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 1 071 000 units
EU: EU proposes a quota of 1 200 600 units
Sheep:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 720 000 units
EU: EU proposes a quota of 335 880 units
Milk:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 11 845 000 tons from 2004 until 2008
and 13 740 000 from 2008 on.
EU: EU proposes a quota of 8 875 000 tons from 2004 until 2008 and 8
870 000 from 2008 on.
Sales to dairies:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 11 183 000 tons from 2004 until 2008
and 13 176 000 from 2008 on.
EU: EU proposes a quota of 6 956 333 tons from 2004 until 2008 and 16
956 333 from 2008 on.
Direct Sales:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 662 000 tons from 2004 until 2008 and
1 918 667 from 2008 on.
EU: EU proposes a quota of  1 918 667 tons from 2004 until 2008 and 1
918 667 from 2008 on.
Sugar: Poland: Poland requests a quota of 1 866 000 tons
EU: EU proposes a quota of 1 665 017 tons
A quota:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 1 650 000 tons
EU: EU proposes a quota of 1 590 533 tons
B quota:
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Poland: Poland requests a quota of 216 000 tons
EU: EU proposes a quota of 74 484 tons
Isoglucose:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 42 000 tons
EU: EU proposes a quota of 2943 tons
A quota:
Poland: Poland requests a quota of 40 000 tons
EU: EU proposes a quota of 2943 tons
B quota: Poland: Poland requests a quota of 2200 tons
EU: EU proposes a quota of 0 tons
Negotiation Interests:
Poland: Polish interest lies in keeping as many farmers as possible in the
sector, in order to receive high level of financial support from the EU budget.
Otherwise, Poland will have to deal with the side effects of forcing out farmers
from  the  sector.  Different  ministries  and  farmers  have  diverse  opinions
concerning.  Farmers  prefer  to  have  highest  possible  quotas,  so  that  they can
benefit from the direct aids. Economists, who are more in favor of a restructuring
in Polish economy and shrink the number of people employed in the agricultural
sector prefer, that EU funding should be allocated to such restructuring activities.
Therefore,  the  Polish  negotiation  team  has  to  reach  a  balance  between  the
farmers’  interest  in  generating  income  and  the  government’s  interest  in  the
general welfare in Poland.  
EU: EU has no interest in aiding agricultural sectors, which are already in
over  production  within  the  EU as  a  whole,  such  as  dairy and sugar  sectors.
Member  states  individually also  have  specific  interests  on  certain  production
quotas due to competitiveness in the agricultural markets. In such cases member
states put extra pressure on blocking the entry of the new comer in the respective
agricultural market. 
Outcomes:
                                        The outcome of quota negotiations is summarized in the following table:
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Table V Outcome of Negotiations on Agricultural Quotas
Product Group Polish offer EU counter-offer Negotiated
Quantity
(outcome)
Field crops general (ha) 9 263 000 9 217 667 9 291 377
Reference Area46 3.61 2.96 3.00
Potato Starch (tons) 262 000 90 546 144 985
Dry fodder (tons) 160 000 0 13 538
Raw tobacco (tons) 55 000 37 933 37 358
Young bulls (units) 2 200 000 857 700 926 000
Suckler Cows (units) 1 500 000 325 581 325 581
Slaughter cattle (units) 2 021 000 2 034 300 1 815 430
Slaughter calves (units) 1 017 000 1 200 600 839 518
Sheep 720 000 335 880 335 880
Milk (2004-tons) 11 845 000 8 875 000 8 964 000
Sales to dairies (tons) 11 183 000 6 956 333 8 500 000
Direct sales (tons) 662 000 1 918 667 464 000
Milk (2008 –tons) 13 740 000 8 875 000 8 964 000
Sales to dairies (tons) 13 176 000 6 956 333 8 916 000
Direct sales (tons) 564 000 1 918 667 464 000
Sugar (tons) 1 866 000 1 665 017 1 674 495
A quota (tons) 1 650 000 1 590 533 1 590 533
B quota (tons) 216 000 74 484 83 961
Isoglucose (tons) 42 200 2 943 6 232
A quota (tons) 40 000 2 943 6 232
B quota (tons) 2 200 0 0
Evaluation of the Outcome:
 Efficiency: Since these quotas are directly linked to the direct aid schemes,  parties were well
informed about their importance. However, negotiation on this topic particularly requires great
flexibility of especially Poland to make issue linkages with other issues and/or chapters in order to
make up for the financial losses due to low quotas set by the EU. Due to the overall complexity of
enlargement negotiations, it is rather difficult to assume that Polish negotiation team did not lack
any efficiency on know-how and experience compared to the EU.  
 Stability: Poland will face the effects of entering into the Single European Market immediately.
46 Poland requested that calculations on reference area should be based on
the years 1989-1992, which were more productive compared to the end of
902. However, EU took the years 1997-2001 as base years.
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However, effects created by the production quotas will be felt after a while. CAP is more of a
social policy rather than an economic policy. It tries to satisfy the needs of an important sector of
the society, which has a very limited contribution to the GDP. Therefore concessions made by
Poland on quotas were tried to be balanced by social aid schemes. Still, it remains to be seen if
these schemes will suffice to secure incomes of the agrarian population in Poland, who are forced
out of business due to CAP regulations. If Poland will not be able to cover its losses by welfare
funds and restructuring programmes, then it may seek to re-negotiate the quotas as a full member.
Therefore the stability of these arrangements cannot be determined yet.  
 Distribution of resources: According to this quota scheme, 95% of potential direct payments will
be allocated to two sectors: field crops47 up to 70% and beef cattle production up to 25%. Field
crop production covers 70% of arable land in Poland. Another important criterion is the size of
farms eligible for direct payments. The Commission proposed a minimum amount of 0.3 ha of
arable land with a width of 20m. According to these standards almost all farms were eligible for
direct payments. Poland proposed a minimum amount of 1ha,which is against the benefit of small
farmers. This proposal shows the Polish strategy of focusing more on industrialization, rather than
maintaining the small farms as an integral part of the rural economy. 
National statistics on agriculture show that beef production was not very
popular  in  Poland.  Nevertheless,  it  received  a  surprisingly  high  amount  of
support  in  the  agreements,  which  again  reflects  Polish  and  EU  policies
concerning  common  organization  of  the  market.  Tobacco  and  potato  starch,
which  are  important  products  in  polish  agriculture  received  a  rather  small
support, in spite of the fact that these sectors will still  benefit from the direct
payments.  
Apparently, Poland had to make a lot of concessions on the production
quotas.  Poland and EU agreed upon a  set  of  social  programmes,  in  order  to
compensate  for  the  losses  of  Poland  and  distribute  the  resources  of  the  EU
budget more fairly. These programmes do not only aim to restructure rural areas,
but secure income of less advantaged farmers.  These structural funds will be
managed as a follow up to the SAPARD Programme until the end of 2006. There
are two programmes designed for this purpose. Sectoral Operational Programme
(SOP) focused on changes in agriculture and agri-food industry, whereas Rural
Development  Plan  (RDP)  has  more  of  a  social  character.  RDP has  a  bigger
47 In  the  case  of  excess  production,  extra  delivery  is  cheaper  for  the
producer (Rawinski, 2003)
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budget and 51% of this budget will be spent for farmers in Less Favored Areas
(LFA). 55% of this budget line is pensions automatically provided for farmers in
LFA’s. Farmers living in mountain zones receive twice more aid than farmers in
lowland zones. 21% of RDP is allocated to semi-subsistence farming with low
level of production. This program has a very low eligibility criterion. Funds for
LFA’s will even be distributed automatically. According to the EU bureaucracy
low eligibility criteria, easy access to funds mean that social purpose of the funds
overweigh  their  importance  concerning  restructuring  policies.   On  the  other
hand, SOP funds require formal application by farmers, which include a good
business plan, investment activities, eligible funding, and a financial plan with
co-financement perspectives. These application requirements are rather difficult
for small and medium sized farms. Even large and industrialized farms will have
hard time in adjusting their work to EU bureaucracy. 
 Distance from the opening position:  At the end of the negotiations, it seems that Poland  reached
a higher quota limit in field crops. On the other hand, , the limits in delicate sectors such as milk
and potato starch are rather low. This can be observed considering that Poland agreed to a selling
arrangement for milk within the country  below the EU standards, for a limited period. Still, milk
and potato starch sectors will lose from their production potential and percentage of farmers from
these sectors will be forced to decrease. Consequently, Poland had to make concession in almost
all quotas, which were tried to be compensated by other funding instruments as explained above.
This outcome again points to a power asymmetry. 
Based solely on the quotas in  numeric sense,  the outcome appears as a
lopsided  compromise  since  EU  made  rather  small  concessions  on  the
initially proposed  figures.  On the  other  hand,  both  parties  revised  their
positions and came up with completely new quotas for certain areas such
as the field crops in general, potato starch, slaughter cattle and direct sales
quotas.   These new quotas  could be  based on arguments  related to the
current agricultural sector in the EU as well as trade-offs between Poland
and the EU with regards to the respective sectors. However, this outcome
is rather difficult to evaluate since many measures to convert agricultural
sector of Poland as well as social welfare funds to increase employability
of agrarian population in other sectors will have an indirect effect on the
gains and losses of Poland from this deal. 
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4.2.3. Negotiations  on  Preparatory,  Transitory  or  Permanent
Measures
The issues under this heading are mainly about the harmonization of the
Polish legislation with that of the EU requirements. This harmonization not only
requires law to be passed in Poland, but also in certain cases the establishment of
new governmental bodies and systems. EU within itself faces many difficulties
concerning the harmonization of national legislations to the acquis.  Therefore
mostly critical issues linked to direct aid schemes were concluded whereas all
other are left to the post negotiation phase.
In this section, EU and Poland's general negotiation interests will be stated
for the entire set of issues. After that all negotiation problems, offers, counter
offers  and  outcomes  will  be  explained  within  the  following  five  categories:
general issues, common organization of the market, structural policy, rural areas
development  and  forestry,  veterinary  matters  and  phytosanitary  issues.  An
overall evaluation of the outcomes will follow this section. 
 
4.2.3.1. General issues
Negotiation Problem: 
Council  Regulation  No  3508/92  of  27  November  1992  requires  the
establishment of the Integrated Administration and Control System. 
Negotiation Position:
Poland  asks  for  support  from  the  EU  budget  to  establish  the  time-
consuming and costly system. The respective regulation permits assistance from
the  EU  budget  to  EU  member  states.  Moreover,  in  previous  enlargements
candidate states benefited from such financial recourses of the EU. EU does not
specify a position towards such assistance in advance. 
Negotiation Interest: 
Poland  would  like  to  share  the  costs  of  some  expensive  infrastructure
needed for the management of EU agricultural systems with the EU. EU already
assisted certain members in this during the previous accession. So, Poland would
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like to receive funding from EU for the establishment of relevant infrastructure.
Offers and Counter-offers:
 Poland requests financial support from the EU budget at the level of 50%
of the costs for three years following the accession. As a response, the European
Union  adopted  the  budget  of  PHARE 2000 Programme,  according  to  which
Poland was provided for a financial support  of 5.500.000 €, which makes up
50% of  the  costs  for  establishment  of  Integrated Administration  and Control
System (IACS). For the year 2001, PHARE covered 2.000.000 € out of a total of
2.200.000  €  for  trainings  and  external  experts  designed  to  assist  the
implementation  of  ARMA-IACS  and  Animal  Identification  and  Registration
System  (I&R).   However,  in  its  regular  report  in  2001  for  Poland,  the
Commission  stressed  problems  encountered  in  the  implementation  of  the
established  IACS.  Following this  report,  Poland  and EU agreed upon a  new
strategy for the functioning of IACS, according to which Poland would outsource
the  building of  informatics  part  of  IACS48.  Still  the  Regular  Report  of  2003
stated  that  there  is  a  risk  of  malfunctioning  of  the  system  on  time  for  the
distribution of direct aids.
Outcome:
 Poland received 50% of the establishment costs of IACS for one year only.
For  the second year, it  received a substantial  amount  for  the implementation
costs.  Furthermore,  both  parties  decided  to  outsource  some  part  of  the
establishment.  
4.2.3.2. Common Organization of Particular Markets49
Negotiation problem: 
One  of  the  negotiation  problems  under  the  heading  of  Common
Organization of Particular Markets is the amendments to existing regulations of
48 Polish government outsourced building of informatics part of IACS to
Hewlett-Packard Poland. 
49 Quota issues are also categorized under this heading. However due to the
importance of both quota and direct  aid issues  in the entire  negotiation
process,  they are  analyzed  separately as  single  headings  of  negotiation
issues.
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the EU concerning addition of certain plants into lists of products eligible for
direct aid. 
Negotiation Positions: 
 EU’s position: The Council  Regulation No 1251/99 of 17 May 1999 lays down the system of
direct  payments  for producers of arable crops listed in  its  Annex I. Polands position:  Poland
requests to have beans for 'dry gain' included in this list and justifies this position based on its
capacity in planting beans, its potential to improve plant production as well as tens of thousands
of Polish farmers and their families working in bean planting. 
 EU’s position: The Commission Regulation No 658/96 of 9 April 1996 lays down the conditions
of granting compensatory payments under a support system for producers of certain arable crops.
Poland’s position: Poland requests to have double low – '00' winter and spring rapeseed on this
list. Poland justifies its position based on the requirements of rapeseed grown in EU, which are
fulfilled by Polish farmers. 
 EU’s position: Commission Regulation No 1164/89 of 28 April 1989 lays down the general rules
concerning the aid for fibre flax and hemp. Poland’s position: Poland requests the expansion of a
list of varieties eligible for aid to include Polish varieties 'ARTEMIDA', 'ALBA', 'WIKO'.
Negotiation Interests: 
First  of all,  Poland aims to maximize  its  gain from the negotiations by
adding its  specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of
agriculture,  which are  eligible  for  direct  aid.  Secondly,  Poland tries  to  avoid
implementing  costly  legislation  particularly  for  sub-sectors  that  are  not
developed. 
On the other hand, EU tries to balance the interests  among its  member
states  on  the  common  organization  of  markets,  which  are  already  strongly
established within the EU15. Being aware of the complications regarding the
harmonization with the acquis, EU wants to set reasonable transition periods for
Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: 
Beans and double low – '00' winter and spring and Polish varieties of fibre
flax rapeseed were not included in the respective regulations.  However, these
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issues could be put on the agenda by Poland once again as a member state during
the post-negotiation phase50.
On the other hand, revised CAP is renationalized by the EU and allows the
member states to stabilize the employment situation in agriculture to a limited
extend. Member states are allowed to reduce the amounts of payments to the
farmers, who are producing the arable crops listed in Annex I with respect to the
calendar  year.  Member  states  could  re-channel  it  into  agri-environmental
measures,  early  retirement  schemes,  less  favored  areas,  and  areas  with
environmental  restrictions  and  forestry  as  additional  Community  support  to
Poland in cases where: 
 The labor force on their holdings falls short of limits (to be determined
by Member States). 
 The overall prosperity of their holdings rises above limits (to be decided
by Member States). 
 The total  amount of payments granted under support schemes exceed
limits (to be decided by Member States).  
It was agreed that the reduction of support to a farmer resulting from the
application of the above measures will not exceed 20% of the total amount of
payments granted to the farmers (European Commission fact sheets, 2004).
Negotiation Problem: 
Commission Regulation No 1524/71 of 16 July 1971 lays down detailed
rules concerning private storage aid for flax and fibres. This regulation also sets
minimum quantities of flax and hemp fibre covered in a private storage contract
eligible for aid51. 
Negotiation Position:
EU position:  EU does  not  state  any position  regarding  the  transitional
measures in advance. Polish position: Poland requests an adjustment period of
three years, when the minimum fibre quantities would be those specified below:
o 5000 kg in the first year after the accession
50 ARTEMIDA and ALBA are added to the list  of  varieties eligible for
direct aid by Commission Regulation 206/2004 on 5 February 2004.
51 CAP measures include financial support for stocking of certain goods,
which are overproduced.
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o 6000 kg in the second year after the accession
o 7000 kg in the third year after the accession
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid.  Poland also tries to avoid implementing the
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed.
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However, this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
 Negotiation Problem: 
One  of  the  regulation  of  the  fruit  and  vegetable  markets  in  EU  is  as
follows:
 Council Regulation no 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the market in
processed fruit and vegetables products and Commission Regulation No 504/97 of 19 March 1997
regulate  main  problems  concerning  the  organization  of  the  market  in  processed  fruit  and
vegetables and lay down rules of financial aid for these products. 
Negotiation Position:
Poland requests to expand the financial aid for processing sector by the
means  of  including  fruit  that  are  important  for  Poland.  Poland  justifies  its
position by the number of farmers working in this market. Poland also stresses
the importance of this sector for the EU. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
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which are eligible for direct aid. Poland also tries to avoid implementing costly
legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
Another regulation of the fruit and vegetable markets in EU is as follows:
 Council Regulation no 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the market in
processed fruit and vegetables products and Commission Regulation No 412/97 of 3 March 1997
lay down rules on the establishment and operations of producer organizations. The Commission
Regulation No: 412/97 provides for the minimum requirements concerning the recognition of
producer organizations in particular countries. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland would like to set adequate requirements for the recognition of producer
organizations in Poland. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Poland also wants to avoid implementing costly
legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
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Offers, Counter-offers:
 Poland requests  that  the  minimum requirements  for the  recognition  of
producer organizations are set as follows:
Minimum number of members: 5
Minimum value of marketable production provided by the members of one
producer organization: 100.000 € 
Outcome:
EU accepts this offer and Polish position prevails, which is a rare outcome.
Negotiation problem:
Another regulation of the fruit and vegetable markets in EU is as follows:
 Council Regulation no 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the market in
processed fruit and vegetables products, Commission Regulation No 478/97 of 14 March 1997
and Commission Regulation 20/98 of 7 January 1998 set up rules for the preliminary recognition
of producer organizations in the EU and the financial support scheme thereof. 
Negotiation Position: 
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests  to have the possibility of granting preliminary recognition to
producer organizations active in horticultural sector in line with the existing ones
in other member states after its accession.  
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers; Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
 Outcome: EU grants Poland a transition period of three years to set criteria
for preliminary recognition of producer organizations.
Negotiation Problem:
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Another regulation of the fruit and vegetable markets in EU is as follows:
 Article 10 of Council Regulation no 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of
the market in processed fruit and vegetables products provides for the rules of granting special
aid- subsidies to improve the quality of some selected fruit and vegetable species. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland  requests  to  ensure  that  this  special  aid  scheme  is  applied  for  the
production of soft fruit, sour cherries, Brussels sprouts and green beans. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations on the quality standards of vegetables is as follows:
 Council Regulation no 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the market in
processed fruit and vegetables products and Commission Regulation No 1677/88 of 15 June 1988
lay down quality standards for cucumbers. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests that cucumbers grown in the open air and weighing less than 180
g are admitted for marketing.
Negotiation Interests: 
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Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However, this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem: 
Regulations related to the common organization of the market in wine are
as follows:
 Commission Regulation No 3800/91 of 16 December 1981 determines the classification of vine
varieties. 
 Commission Regulation No 2314/72 of 30 October 1972 sets up the procedures related to the
assessment of vibe variety suitability for cultivation. 
 Council Regulation no 2389/89 of 24 July 1989 sets up general rules for classification of vine
varieties  and provides  definitions  for  the terms  used.  Poland would like to  be  released from
applying this regulation on the same grounds.
 Commission Regulation No 940/81 of 7 April 1981 lays down the principles of declaring areas
used for producing vegetative propagation material for vines. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests to be released from the obligation of applying the Commission
Regulation,  since  it  lacks  commercially  valuable  vine  varieties.  Poland  also
would like to keep its own registration system and not apply the regulation based
on the argument that grapes are rather less important plants and therefore their
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registration  system is  also  less  complex.  Additionally  Poland  requests  to  be
released form the obligation of applying the provisions of the regulation since
there  are  no  vine  varieties  existing  and  therefore  no  marketing  of  certified
propagation  material  for  vine,  no  fixed  cultivation  areas  and  commercial
production of this plant. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: 
Parties agreed to postpone these decisions until the accession.
Negotiation Problem:
Regulations related to the common organization of the market in spirits are
as follows:
 Commission  Regulation  1222/94  of  20  May 1994  lays  down  common  detailed  rules  for  the
application of the system of granting export refunds on certain agricultural products exported in
the form of goods not covered by the Annex II of the Treaty and the criteria for fixing the amount
of such refunds. Council Regulation No 2825/93 of 15 October 1993 lays down certain detailed
rules for the application of Council Regulation No 1766/92 as regards the fixing and granting
adjusted refunds in respect of cereals exported in the form of certain spirit drinks. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland  requests  export  refunds  to  be  granted  on  the  Polish  cereal  vodkas
exported to the third countries based on the grounds of equal treatment among
member states. 
Negotiation Interests: 
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Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
Another regulation related to the common organization of the market in
wine is as follows:
 Article 24 of Commission Regulation NO 3201/90 lays down detailed rules for the description
and presentation of wines and grape musts. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland  requests  to  ensure  the  possibility  for  Polish  producers  to  place  the
inscription 'Polish wine/Polskie wino owocowe' on the fruit wine labels. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
71
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 EU accepted  this  offer,  however  limited  the  marketing  of  such  wines
inside Poland only.
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Negotiation Problem:
Another regulation related to the common organization of the market in
spirits is as follows:
 Council Regulation NO 1576/89 of 29 May 1989 and Commission Regulation No 1014/90 of 24
April 1990 determine the rules on placing spirit drinks on the market. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests:
1. Extension of the list  of spirit  drinks subject to the protection in respect of their  geographical
origin
2. Supplementing the Article one of the Council regulation No 1576/89 with two new categories of
spirit drinks 'Starka' and 'Winiak'
3. Providing protection for certain designations in accordance with the Annex to the Article 7A of
the Commission Regulation No 1014/90
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the use of raw materials for the production
of wine and spirits are as follows:
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 The Council Regulation No 1576 and Commission Regulation No 1014:İ/90 determine the rules
for spirit marketing. The Council Regulation No 1576/89 also lays down quality requirement for
the farm produced spirit and specified products with registered geographical trade names. These
regulations are not only legislative acts in this respect. As far as raw materials are concerned EU
legislation only provides for that spirit  intended for food products manufacture must originate
from the farm products defined in the Annex II to the Rome Treaty. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests to work out the arrangements that would allow maintaining the
present structure in respect of the raw materials used for production of spirit in
Poland after its accession to the EU.
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
 Negotiation Problem: 
One of the regulations related to banana import into the Community is as
follows:
 Commission  Regulation No 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 lays down detailed rules concerning
tariff quotas for banana imports into the European Community. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
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Poland requests to refrain from adopting the currently effective regimes due to
the pending WTO negotiations on this issue. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland  would  like  to  preserve  its  protective  regimes  towards  third
countries until the WTO negotiations are concluded. EU has to make sure that
Poland adopts the necessary regimes in line with WTO rules once an agreement
is reached, since otherwise EU would be obliged to pay for the extra protection
costs towards third countries.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: Primary documents  related  to  the  negotiation  process  do  not
contain  any reference  to  this  issue.  However  this  issue  could  be  put  on  the
agenda by Poland  once  again  as  a  member  state  during the  post-negotiation
phase52.
Negotiation Problem
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
tobacco sector is as follows:
 Council Regulation No 2075/92 of 20 June 1992 on common organization of the market in raw
tobacco, Commission regulation NO 2848/98 of 22 December 1998 laying down detailed rules of
the application of the latter, Council Regulation No 2077/92 of 30 June 1992 concerning inter-
branch organizations and agreements in the tobacco sector and Council Regulation No 86/93 of
19 January 1993 concerning detailed rules to implement the latter set up premium system for raw
tobacco producers as well as lay down detailed rules for the establishment, recognition and aid
scheme for producer groups. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Concerning  the  establishment  of  the  volume  of  raw  tobacco  production
(expressed as percentage rate of total output in a given production area) required
52 Commission  Regulation  No  1892/04  of  29  October  2004
lays down   the transitional measures for 2005 for imports of
bananas into the Community by reason of the accession of the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia
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for  the  recognition  of  a  producer  group,  Poland  requests  that  0.4  %  is  the
minimum for a producer group to become recognized. Poland determined this
figure based on the capacity of tobacco producers. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland would like to  keep its  small  farmers  in  the sector,  whereas  EU
wants Poland to restructure its agricultural sector in line with the EU priorities.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: 
EU did not  accept this minimum percentage favoring small  farmers but
granted  Poland  a  transition  period  of  5  years  to  set  the  threshold  for  the
recognition  of  a  producer  group  at  1%  of  the  guarantee  threshold  for  all
production regions in Poland. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
tobacco sector is as follows:
 Council  Regulation  No  2075/902 of  30  June  on  common organization  of  the  market  in  raw
tobacco and Commission Regulation No 2848/98 of 22 December 1998 laying down detailed
rules for the application of the latter on the aid scheme comprise regulations implementing the
obligation of delimiting production areas and the groups of varieties grown in a given production
areas as well as the obligation of registering cultivation contracts. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland wants to put certain tobacco varieties onto the list of varieties grown in
the EU. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
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Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: 
Polish  varieties  are  amended  to  be  listed  in  the  Annex  of  Council
regulation  No  2075/92,  however  there  isn't  any  entry  in  the  Commission
Regulation No 2848/98 according to the primary documents. This issue could be
put  on the agenda by Poland once again as a member state  during the post-
negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
oil seeds and fibre plants sector is as follows:
 Art. 2 of the Commission Directive 66/401/EEC of 14 June 1966 on the marketing of fodder plant
seeds, Art 2 of the Commission Directive 66/402/EEC of 14 June 1966 on the marketing of cereal
seed and Art 2 of the Commission Directive 69/208/EEC of 30 June 1969 on the marketing of
seeds of oil and fibre plants specify the species covered by the quality requirements. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests the exemption from obligatory application of those provisions of
these directives that refer to a set of products listed by the Polish government,
which are not grown in Poland. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland would like to refrain from any legislative measure imposed by the
acquis whenever they are not relevant to the Polish agricultural sector
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase
Negotiation Problem:
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One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
vine sector is as follows:
 Council Directive 68/193/EEC regulates the marketing of material for vegetative propagation of
the  vine  and Commission  Directive  72/169/EEC determines  the characteristics  and minimum
conditions for inspecting vine varieties. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests to maintain its qualification system of field inspection of vine
since vine production has a very law capacity in Poland. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland would like to refrain from any legislative measure imposed by the
acquis whenever they are not relevant to the Polish agricultural sector
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 This decision has been postponed until the accession. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
hops sector is as follows:
 Commission Regulation No 890/78 of 28 April 1978 is on detailed rules of hops certification and
Commission Regulation No 3077/78 of 21 December 1978 is on equivalence with the Community
certificates of attestations accompanying hops imported from outside the Community. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland  requests  a  period  of  four  months  after  the  accession  to  provide  the
Commission with a list of authorized certification bodies and a specification of
hops production areas.
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
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organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome: 
EU granted the requested four months. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
hops sector is as follows:
 Commission Regulation No 1517/77 of 6 July 1977 specifies all the hops varieties cultivated in
the EU. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests to add 10 hops varieties to this list. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. 
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
At present there is no legislation for the common organization of the EU
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market for potatoes. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests such a regulation entering into force.  
Negotiation Interests:
Poland would like to introduce direct aim schemes for an important sector
of its agricultural production. EU does not have an interest to expand the lists of
products subject to direct aid. 
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
There is no support for producers of herbs, medicinal and aromatic plants.
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests support for herb producers.
Negotiation Interests:
Poland would like to introduce direct aim schemes for an important sector
of its agricultural production. EU does not have an interest to expand the lists of
products subject to direct aid.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem: 
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
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dairy sector is as follows:
 Council  Regulation  No  1255/99  and Council  regulation  No 785/98 provide  opportunities  for
subsidizing private storage of chosen brands of long-keeping cheese produced in the Union and
define detailed rules on such subsidizing.
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland  requests  inclusion  of  Polish  made  Ementalski  and  Parmezan  cheese
brands into the private storage aid scheme.
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
dairy sector is as follows:
 Council Regulation 2597/97 lay down the additional rules on the common organization of market
in milk and milk products for drinking milk, which lists definitions and standards for drinking
milk,  classifying it  by butterfat content. Council Regulation no 98/280 laying down additional
rules  on  the  common  organization  of  market  in  milk  and  milk  products  for  drinking  milk
produced in Finland and Sweden. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
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Poland requests the admission of a 2 years post accession period of production of
drinking milk with butterfat content other than defined in EU regulations for the
domestic market and export to third countries. Poland refers to a similar conduct
for Sweden and Finland as stated in the Council Regulation no 98/280, which
allowed these countries to sell such milk on local market and to third countries.
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 EU accepts this transition phase, however limits  the marketing of such
milk produced within the domestic market of Poland only.
Negotiation Problem: 
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
beaf and veal sector is as follows:
 Council Regulation No 1254/99 of 17 May 1999 defines the amount of premiums for beaf and
veal.
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests granting a national ceiling for slaughter premiums under the Art
11 of the respective regulation at a level equivalent to the number of animals
slaughtered or exported in 1995 in each eligible category: 
Bulls, stears, cows and heifers: 2.021.000 units
Calves:1.017.000 units.
Negotiation Interests: 
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Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome: 
EU fixed the following ceilings:
Bulls, stears, cows and heifers: 1.815.430 units
Calves:839.518 units.
Negotiation Problem:
Other regulations related to the common organization of the market in beaf
and veal sector are as follows:
 Council  Regulation  No  1254/99  of  17  May  1999  lays  down  the  basic  regulation  for  the
organization of the common market for beef and defines the amount of premiums. 
 A second negotiation problem based on this regulation is the regional ceiling for special  beef
premiums; both the level of ceiling and the method of defining. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland  states  the  level  of  limit  as  well  as  the  method  of  definition  as  a
negotiation problem. Poland requests to limit of individual premiums for suckler
cows at a level of 1.5 millions and asks for abandoning the principles applied
generally and application of derogation to the regulation in force. Poland justifies
its position by the reduced number of milk producers due to the quota system,
who will shift to the production of milk solely to feed calves and therefore cattle
production. It also refers to the similar agreement made with Austria, Finland
and Sweden during their accession negotiations. Again based on the previous
agreements  made  with  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden  during  their  accession
negotiations,  Poland  requests  a  limit  of  2.2  million  units  of  special  beef
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premium. Poland justifies its position by stating that the small cattle production
by the time is below capacity due to the transformation of the market and very
low prices in beef livestock. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 EU agrees that Poland should decide the national, regional and individual
limits;  however  gives a three years transition phase for Poland to list  all  the
additional breeds53. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
beaf and veal sector is as follows:
 Commission  Regulation  No  2456/93  of  1  September  1993  lays  down  detailed  rules  for  the
application of Council Regulation No 805/68 as regards general and special intervention measures
for beef. It defines classes of cattle eligible for intervention. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests to have the right for intervention purchase of beef in R2, R3, O2
and O3 classes. Poland justifies its argument based on the practice in other EU
countries.
53 Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1782/2003  of  29  September  2003
established common rules for direct support schemes  under the common
agricultural policy and established certain support schemes for farmers and
amended Regulation  No 1254/1999 among others
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Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 EU asks Poland to approach the Commission on this matter one year after
the accession. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
beaf and veal sector is as follows:
 Commission  Regulation  No  3886/92  of  23  December  1992  lays  down detailed  rules  for  the
application of the premium schemes provided for in the Council Regulation No 805/68 on the
common organization of the market in beef and repeals Regulations 1244/82 and 714/89. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests the adoption of suckler cow premium scheme under the same
principles as had been adopted for Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
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Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome: 
EU gives Poland a transition phase of three years for the adoption of the
suckler cow premium scheme. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
sheap and goat sector is as follows:
 Council Regulation No 3091/89 of 25 September 1989 on the common organization of the market
in sheep meat and goat meat is a basic market regulation on sheep meat and goat meat. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland would like to apply its own national ewe premium scheme based on the
implementation  of  the  'Programme  for  improvement  of  sheep  population  in
Poland up to 2010'. Therefore Poland does not want to have this special product
line managed according to a unified aid scheme.
Negotiation Interests: 
Poland  aims  to  maximize  its  gain  from the  negotiations  by adding  its
specific products to the lists of products in different sub-sectors of agriculture,
which are eligible for direct aid. Secondly Poland tries to avoid implementing
costly legislation particularly for sub-sectors which are not developed. 
EU tries to  balance the interests  among member states on the common
organization of markets, which are already strongly established within the EU15.
Being aware of the complications regarding the harmonization with the acquis,
EU will try to set reasonable transition periods for Poland.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
beaf and veal sector is as follows:
 Council Regulation No 3013/89 of 25 September 1989 also defines premium right ceilings and
disbursement principles. 
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Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland would like to have the ceilings defined for each state separately as it was
the case during EFTA enlargement.
Negotiation Interests:
 Poland would like to have high ceilings for premium schemes in order to
receive more funding from the EU budget. EU needs Polish contribution to the
EU market  in  this  sector,  however  would  like  to  keep  the  ceiling  low until
Poland reaches certain veterinary standards.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
  Poland requests a ceiling of 600 000 ewes for premium rights. EU accepts
to define the ceilings for each state separately, however sets a national ceiling of
335 880 ewes. Individual ceilings for producers are left to Poland's decision. 
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the common organization of the market in
sheap and goat sector is as follows:
 Commission Regulation No 2385/91 of 6 August 1991 lays down detailed rules for certain special
cases regarding definition of sheep meat and goat meet producers and producer groups. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests that certain producers, who have to transfer their animals into
other areas due to the deficiency of green fodder should also be considered as
farmers working in less favored area. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland would like to expand the definition of les favored area in relation to
its animal producers, in order to receive more funding. EU does not have interest
in expanding the regions eligible for funding yet.
Offers, Counter-offers: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
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 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
4.2.3.3. Structural policy, rural areas development and forestry
Negotiation Problem: 
One of the regulations related to the forestry is as follows:
 Related to the forestry in the EU; Council Directive 66/404/EEC of 14 June 1966 and Council
Directive  71/161/EEC  of  30  March  1971  oblige  the  Member  States  to  identify  reproductive
material with a  certificate of origin from the moment the seeds are collected till they are supplied
to a recipient. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests a transition period of 8 years until 31 December 2010 to come
up with a similar control system. 
Negotiation Interests:
Poland wants long transition periods for costly infrastructure necessary for
the implementation of the EU control systems, in order to reduce the costs of
accession.  EU  on  the  other  hand  wants  the  new  comers  ready  for  the
implementation of CAP measures. 
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome: 
EU grants Poland the requested transition period, so the Polish position
prevails.
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4.2.3.4.Veterinary matters
Negotiation Problem:
One of the regulations related to the veterinary issues with regards to the
dairy sector is as follows:
 Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 lays down the health rules for the production and
placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland has to adjust farm holdings producing milk and dairy processing plants in
line  with  the  EU  requirements.  Poland  requests  that  raw-milk  in  Polish
veterinary standards should be allowed to be sold  in domestic  market,  and a
transition period of two-three years after the accession should be given to all
establishments,  which do not fit  the EU criteria. Additionally Poland requests
derogations from these criteria certain products produced in a traditional way.
Negotiation Interests:
Poland wants to avoid spending too much national resources on the costly
veterinary measures  during the  first  years of  accession.  EU tries  to  keep the
veterinary standards within its market.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:  EU grants  Poland  a  transition  period  of  12  months  after  the
accession  to  bring  a  total  number  of  113  establishments  in  line  with  the
respective legislation54. However EU allows Poland to sell milk below the EU
criteria to domestic market and third countries during this period. 
 Negotiation Problem: 
One of the regulations related to the veterinary issues with regards to the
meat products is as follows:
 Council  Directives  77/99/EEC  of  21  December  1976,  94/65/EC  of  14  December  1994,
64/443/EEC of 26 June 1964, 71/118/EEC of 15 February 1971, 92/45/EEC of 16 June 1992 and
54 Details issued in Commission Regulation 2004/458/EC of 29
April 2004
90
91/495/EEC of 27 November 1990 lay down the veterinary requirements for the production and
placing on the market of meat products. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests  that small  capacity establishments  are temporarily allowed to
produce for the domestic market and third countries for a period of 4 years.
Negotiation Interests:
Poland wants to avoid spending too much national resources on the costly
veterinary measures  during the  first  years of  accession.  EU tries  to  keep the
veterinary standards within its market.
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 EU grants Poland a transition period of three years after the accession to
bring  a  total  number  of  332 meat  establishments  in  line  with  the  respective
legislation55.  However EU allows Poland to sell  meat  products below the EU
criteria on domestic market during this period. 
4.2.3.5.  Phytosanitary issues
Negotiation Problem: 
The following Council Directives lay down detailed rules for phytosanitary
issues in member states,  which deal with the healthy production in European
agricultural sector:
 Council Directive No 91/414/EEC and Council Regulation No 79/117/EEC lay down the rules for
marketing and application of plant protection products. The marketing of pesticides containing
biologically active agents, which are banned on the EU market is prohibited. 
 Council Directive No 77/93/EEC lays down phytosanitary measures to prevent transmission onto
the Community territory of organisms harmful to plants or plant products. 
 Council  Directive No 77/93/EEC Annex V contains the list  of goods subject to phytosanitary
check. 
55 Details issued in Commission Regulation 2004/458/EC of 29 April 2004
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 Council  Directive  No 77/93/EEC establishes  protected  zones  throughout  the  Community free
from certain harmful organisms. 
Negotiation Positions:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests to make new entries in the list of products banned and to expand
the list of products in the respective directive. Also, Poland wants to add new
products  to the list  of  goods subject to  phytosanitary check and requests  that
these zones are controlled if they have a list of harmful organisms presented by
Poland.
Negotiation Interests:
Poland is more advanced in plant protection and wants new measures in
this field introduced to the agricultural legislation of the EU.  EU does not have
an interest to revise acquis imposing new conditions to the EU 15 during the
negotiations  with  new  comers,  since  EU  already  has  difficulties  to  balance
interests of the existing members and new comers. 
Offers, Counter-offers: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase. However Poland
is given a transition agreement until 31 December 2006 for the market placement
of certain plant protection products. 
Negotiation Problem: 
One of the regulations related to the phytosanitary issues is as follows:
 Council Directive No 69/464/EEC lays down measures to be taken by member states to control
potato wart disease. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests a 10-years transition period upon accession during which only
potato varieties resistant to potato wart disease could be planted. 
Negotiation Interest: 
Poland has a large capacity in potato production and would like to avoid
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EU measures, which could hamper its production rates. 
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome:
 EU agreed on a transition phase for the implementation of this directive.
Negotiation Problem: 
Another regulation related to the phytosanitary issues is as follows:
 Council Regulation No 2100/94 of 4 April 1994 lays down plant variety rights. 
Negotiation Position:
EU  position:  EU  asks  for  alignment  with  the  acquis.  Polish  position:
Poland requests from the Community to cover plant variety rights those Polish
varieties that have been granted protection in Poland not earlier than four years
before Poland's accession to the EU or -in the case of trees and vine – not earlier
than six years before accession. 
Negotiation Interest: 
Poland  would  like  to  avoid  costly measures  for  the  definition  of  plant
varieties. 
Offers, Counter-offers:
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue.
Outcome: 
Primary documents related to the negotiation process do not contain any
reference to this issue. However this issue could be put on the agenda by Poland
once again as a member state during the post-negotiation phase.
Evaluation of the Outcome:
Table  VI summarizes  the  outcomes of  negotiations  on  all  issues  about
agricultural legislation and its implementation except for quotas and direct aid
schemes.  The  issues,  which were  left  unresolved,  are  considered  as  potential
negotiation issues after the accession, therefore are referred to as “no outcome –
post negotiation” in the table. According to this table, out of 46 problem issues,
23 (50 %) were left unresolved; therefore could be considered as issues to be
settled during the post negotiation phase.  6 issues (13%) are postponed, whereas
8  (17%)  ended  up  with  mutual  compromise,  since  both  parties  made  some
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concessions in order to reach an agreement. Polish position prevailed in 4 issues
(9%) and EU position prevailed in 2 issues (4%). However, for 2 other issues
(4%) EU makes very little concession in order to reach an agreement, so that
these two outcomes could be considered as lopsided compromises. 
TABLE VI  Summary of the Outcomes of the Negotiations on Preparatory,
Transitory or Permanent Measures
Negotiation Problem Outcome
A. General Issues Mutual compromise
B. Common Organization of the Market
B.1.1. arable crops / dry gain varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.1.2. arable crops / rapeseed varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.1.3.  arable  crops  /  fibre  flax  and
hemp
No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.2. storage aid for flax and fibres No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.3.1. processed fruit and vegetables No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.3.2. processed fruit and vegetables Polish position prevails
B.3.3. processed fruit and vegetables Lopsided compromise 
B.3.4. processed fruit and vegetables No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.3.5. processed fruit and vegetables No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.4.1. vine varieties Decision postponed
B.4.2. vine varieties Decision postponed
B.4.3. vine varieties Decision postponed
B.4.4. vine varieties Decision postponed
B.4.5. vine varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.4.6. vine varieties Mutual compromise
B.4.7. vine varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.4.8. vine varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.5.1. tariff quotas for banana imports No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.5.2. premium system for raw tobacco
producers
Lopsided compromise
B.5.3. Polish tobacco varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.5.4. marketing of seeds No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.5.5.  marketing  of  material  for
vegetative propagation of vine
Decision postponed
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Negotiation Problem Outcome
B.5.6. hops certification Polish position prevails
B.5.7. hops varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.5.8.common  organization  of  the
potato market
No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.5.9. support for her producers No outcome - Post negotiation
B.6.1. dairy product varieties No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.6.2. dairy product varieties Mutual compromise
B.7.1. slaughter premiums Mutual compromise
B.7.2. suckler cow premiums Mutual compromise
B.7.3. regional ceiling for special beef
premiums
Mutual compromise
B.7.4. general and specific intervention
measures for beef
Decision postponed
B.7.5. premium schemes EU position prevails
B.7.6. sheep&goat meat market No outcome - Post negotiation 
B.7.7.  premium  right  ceilings  and
disbursement principles
EU position prevails
B.7.8.  sheep&goat  meet  producer
groups
No outcome - Post negotiation 
C.   Structural  policy,  rural  areas
development and forestry
Polish position prevails
D. Veterinary matters
D.1. dairy products Mutual compromise
D.2. meat products Mutual compromise
E.  Phytosanitary measures
E.1. plant production products No outcome - Post negotiation 
E.2. transmission of harmful organisms No outcome - Post negotiation 
E.3.  goods  subject  to  phytosanitary
check
No outcome - Post negotiation 
E.4. protected zones No outcome - Post negotiation 
E.5. potato wart disease Polish position prevails
E.6. plant variety rights No outcome - Post negotiation 
 Efficiency: These legislative arrangements are difficult to settle for both parties. They are not only
complex,  but  also  involv  parties  with  different  interests  such  as  agricultural,  economy  and
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environmental authorities. Even if Poland manages to bring all issues on the agenda in an efficient
way, EU still has to harmonize all acts with existing legislation, interests of the member states as
well  as macroeconomic interests  of the EU as a whole.  On the other hand, both parties have
diverse options for solutions,  such as trade-offs among product listings, transition periods and
subventions. 
 Stability:   Most  of  the  decisions  have  been  directly  or  indirectly  postponed.  The  remaining
outcomes  very much  depend  on  the  state  after  the  transition  periods  granted.  Therefore  the
outcomes of these sets of negotiations cannot be considered as stable. 
 Distribution of resources:   Most  salient  issues under this  heading deal  with the integration of
certain Polish products into the EU listings, so that Poland could benefit from direct aid schemes
for  these  specified  products.  However,  these  negotiations  are  either  postponed  or  transition
periods are agreed upon. Therefore several producer groups will not be able to benefit from the
EU budget yet. 
 Distance from the opening position: In cases of agreement, mostly both parties made concessions
from their initial positions. However, considering the effect of the postponed decisions on Polish
farmers, Poland is much further away from its opening position. 
4.3. Overall Evaluation of the Outcomes Based on the Characteristics
of Enlargement Negotiations
Hermann's  framework  suggests  that  in  situations  of  power  asymmetry,
processes of negotiation tend to lead to a lopsided compromise, if the negotiators
have  to  satisfy  the  interests  of  diverse  parties.  In  the  case  of  agricultural
negotiations, the output is mostly lopsided compromise especially for issues of
high  importance  such  as  direct  aids.  However,  when  it  comes  to  legislative
harmonization, many decisions crucial for the Polish farmers were moved to the
post-negotiation phase, which in the end result could be interpreted as a deadlock
or papering over differences, since neither party made major concessions and
none of the parties positions prevailed. The parties will most likely bring these
issues back to the agenda in the future once they find a ripe moment to do so.
This  outcome  could  be  explained  by  using  the  other  characteristics  of  the
negotiations. 
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Firstly, in the enlargement negotiations nothing is decided until everything
is  decided.  The  key  issue,  which  prolonged  the  negotiation  phase,  was  the
financial measures of CAP and access of the new comers to these measures. As it
can be read from the regular reports, the focus was more on the establishment of
necessary structures to implement CAP measures until the decision on budget
allocations was reached. Negotiations could be concluded only after the decision
of the European Council on the phased access to financial measures. Therefore
Polish and EU negotiation teams might have made a trade-off by letting Poland
benefit partially from the EU budget and keeping some farming sectors out of
these mechanisms until agreed upon transition phases are completed.  
Secondly,  enlargement  negotiations  are  nested  games,  since  negotiation
teams  have  to  represent  the  interest  of  diverse  parties.  While  agreements  on
direct aid schemes and quotas could be easily followed by the constituents of
both parties, legislative arrangements are far more technical. It is rather difficult
for the farming groups to assess the consequences of leaving these issues to the
post-negotiation phase. So, it  is not so clear why the Polish team might have
resisted less in this set of issues. 
In the post negotiation phase, Poland will have the opportunity to negotiate
on the reforms related to CAP as well as their reflection to the EU budget as a
full  member state  with strong voting power.  However,  as the Polish  farming
organizations also stress, the unequal treatment regarding the budget allocation
will have a negative effect on the competitiveness as well as the restructuring of
the Polish agriculture. This fact will remain even if the Polish authorities use the
post-negotiation  phase  in  the  most  effective  way.  Concerning  the  legislative
harmonization, postponed decisions are mostly brought to the EU agenda right
after the full accession of new comers in 2004. The issues, which were not stated
in the Act of Accession and therefore automatically left to the post-negotiation
phase could either be brought up to the EU agenda by Poland once again as a full
member  or  left  to  the case  law.  For  the  latter  to  happen,  individual  farming
organizations left out from aid schemes or the European Commission could open
law suits so that the European Court  of Justice could take decisions for their
specific situations. This way these decisions are part of the entire EU legislation.
Other farming organizations  affected by the same legislation could base their
actions on the respective decisions of the European Court of Justice. Therefore
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the  acts  of  Polish  authorities  as  well  as  their  constituents  will  be  highly
important, so that in the long term after the accession negative consequences of
the enlargement negotiations for Poland could be dealt with. 
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This thesis aimed to analyze the enlargement negotiations between Poland
and the EU on the chapter of agriculture, which is one of the most complicated
chapters  among the  31 chapters  of  the acquis  communataire  of  the EU.  The
complexity  of  this  chapter  does  not  only  lie  in  the  numerous  legislation  it
encompasses  on  the  common  organization  of  the  market,  veterinary  and
phytosanitary issues, but also the financial measures of the common agricultural
policy of the EU. These measures make up to almost  half of the EU budget.
Therefore candidate states with a large agricultural population, such as Poland,
had a strong interest in benefiting from the financial measures of CAP as the
EU15 states. On the other hand, net contributors to the EU budget showed no
interest for compensating the poor Eastern neighbors. Neither were the EU 15
states with large agricultural population interested in sharing the EU resources
with  the  new  comers.  Therefore  EU  and  Poland  aimed  to  come  up  with
permanent  and  transitory  measures  for  Poland’s  alignment  with  the  acquis,
which would balance these diverse interests at best.
The  road  to  the  negotiations  was  however  long  and  difficult  for  both
parties. Poland had to liberalize its market and adjust its economic structures to
the norms of the single market within the EU. Poland also had to undergo several
institutional reforms in order to harmonize its market instruments. It established
political bodies dealing with the accession to the EU, which were revised and
restructured again and again along the process. On the other hand, EU had to
prepare itself  to its  largest  enlargement.  This enlargement was significant  not
only because of its scope, but also because of the low level of development and
welfare in  most  of the candidate states.  Therefore,  EU needed precautions to
prevent the side affects of the enlargement as much as possible. For this purpose
heads of the member states adopted the Copenhagen criteria, which have to be
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fulfilled by all candidate states. According to the Copenhagen criteria, candidates
should  have  stable  institutions  guaranteeing  democracy,  rule  of  law,  human
rights and minority rights; a functioning market economy and capacity to cope
with  the  competitive  pressure  of  the  EU,  and  ability  to  adopt  the  acquis.
Additionally, the EU should have the capacity to absorb new members without
endangering  the  momentum  of  European  integration.  Candidate  states
performance towards the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria was assessed by
the  European Commission  through its  regular  annual  reports  issued  for  each
candidate state. 
At  the  Luxembourg  Summit  of  the  European  Council  (1997),  the
Commission presented its Opinion towards the candidates, based on which the
Council  took the decision on their accession process. At this Summit,  Poland
was declared as ready to enter the enlargement negotiations already within the
first  wave  of  candidates.  Poland  adopted  a  National  Strategy for  Integration
(1997)  and  signed  the  Accession  Partnership  with  the  EU  (1998).  The
negotiations on the acquis between Poland and the EU started in 1998 and lasted
until 2002. While simple and politically insignificant chapters such as education,
culture, and statistics were completed within the first months, more problematic
chapters such as agriculture, the four freedoms56 and environment took years. 
Screening of the agriculture chapter started in September 1998 and lasted
until June 1999. Poland submitted its first negotiation position on agriculture in
November 1998. Formal negotiations on this chapter started in June 2000, when
the common position of the European Union was presented to Poland. They were
finalized in 2002 and following the assent of the European Parliament and the
approval of the national parliaments by simple majority Poland and EU signed
the Act of Accession in 2004. 
Negotiations took place between the negotiation team of Poland and the
Council  of  the  European  Union.  However  Commission  served  as  a  kind  of
broker between these two parties, since it presented the acquis to the candidates,
drafted  common  positions  for  the  Council  as  a  response  to  the  positions  of
Poland and also tried to come up with a ‘third option’ to satisfy the needs of both
parties as much as possible in cases of disagreement. This process is repeated
56 The four freedams are freedom of movement of capital,
persons, services and goods
100
until both parties reach an agreement. On the one hand, this system prolonged the
process  and  made it  more  complicated  to  balance  the  interests  of  all  parties
involved. On the other hand, it encouraged the parties to make concessions in
order to be able to finalize the negotiation process. 
The chapter on agriculture covered three important sets of issues. Firstly,
Poland  and  EU had  to  agree  upon  the  access  of  Poland  into  the  direct  aid
schemes of CAP from the EU budget. This was a highly critical issue for all
candidate states with large agricultural population. The EU had to come up with
a single formula for all candidates. While the net contributors to the EU budget
were  strongly against  paying for  the  poor  agricultural  population  of  the  new
comers, the candidates rejected strongly to being kept out of the CAP measures.
They claimed that this would not only create a second class membership, but also
strongly harm new comers, which do not have the capacity to compete with the
member  states  with  access  to  CAP  financing.  As  an  end  result  both  parties
compromised in having direct aids phased in from 2006 on until  2007, which
could be topped up from financial resources available in national envelopes of by
co-financement.
Second major set of issues were the quotas of products eligible for direct
aid. Poland had to make great concession in its dairy and beef products sector,
whereas  its  position  concerning the arable crops and sugar was more or  less
accepted  by  the  EU  due  to  the  priorities  of  the  agricultural  market  on  the
European level favoring Polish production of arable crops and sugar. Third set of
issues dealt with the legislative alignment of Poland to the acquis on agriculture.
Mostly  Poland  requested  to  have  its  specific  products  listed  in  the  relevant
regulations or directives, which define products eligible for direct  aid.  Poland
and EU left more than half of the issues defined in Poland’s position paper to the
post-negotiation phase.  The outcomes of these two sets  of issues will  have a
clear effect  on the farmers particularly in  the dairy and beef products sector.
However, the exact impact on Poland could not be assessed without having a
clear  picture  of  the  results  of  the  negotiations  on  other  important  chapters.
Farmers who are excluded from the direct aid schemes could benefit from rural
development  or  structural  funds  in  order  to  restructure  and  improve  their
agricultural  holdings,  change  their  production  lines  or  learn  new  jobs.  This
outcome stresses the importance of issue-linkages in enlargement negotiations.
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Additionally it shows the importance of the preparation for the negotiations by
thorough analysis of the acquis and the situation of the country concerning the
respective acquis chapter. A candidate state could manage beneficial outcomes if
and only if its negotiation team is well informed to be flexible enough to link
different issues with each other and maximize its benefit from the entire process.
Overall  Poland  in  alliance  with  the  other  candidate  states  with  large
agricultural population struggled hard to gain access to the financial mechanisms
of CAP and considering the strong opposition from many member states they
were successful. Poland could hardly reach its aim with regards to the quotas in
important agricultural sectors, however in the long run its success will depend on
its performance during the post-negotiation phase as well. Most of the legislation
related to the common organization of the market, veterinary and phytosanitary
issues will be re-negotiated while Poland is already an insider. Poland will also
vote for the new financial framework, CAP reforms as well as new quotas as a
member state. Poland already prepared the optimum grounds for this phase by
blocking the convention negotiation due to the less favorable voting system the
Convention had proposed and together with Spain managed to convince the EU
leaders to accept the Nice formula for qualified majority voting. According to the
Nice formula Poland will have its weight very close to the weights of the big four
of the EU; Germany, France, UK and Italy and therefore a considerable power in
policy areas, which are decided upon by Qualified Majority Voting. 
On the larger scale, Poland’s accession along with other CEEC had a clear
impact on the policy making of the EU in the field of agriculture. The EU is
divided into two different groups, one supporting a protectionist policy such as
CAP to ensure the welfare of large agricultural sector whereas the other group
pushes for a more progressive financial framework for EU, which would shift the
funding from agriculture  to  research and development  (Sapir  et  al,  2003)  for
creating an EU of knowledge. Poland found its allies in the former from among
the candidates as well as member states to push for the preservation of the CAP
measures. This way accession of the CEEC delayed the plans of the supporters of
an EU dedicating its resources to research and development and education. 
This thesis presents the negotiation process on the chapter of agriculture
between  Poland  and  EU  and  also  discusses  main  arguments  underlying
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negotiation moves of both parties on this  chapter with respect to the specific
context of eastern enlargement. However, as stated above, the actual impact of
the outcomes of the negotiation highly depends on Poland’s moves under the
umbrella of the EU as a full member state. 
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